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INTRODUCTION
The capital of Ukraine, the largest and richest city of the republic, is at the same time a 
complicated administrative structure, comprising the city of Kiev and 10 independent 
rayons, which have their own elected councils, their own rayon administrations sub-
ordinated to these councils, and their own independent budgets. The ten rayons, with 
their main indicators, are listed in Table 1.1, and the location of Kiev rayons, identiﬁed 
by their numbers, is shown in Figure 1.1.1 
Table 1.1
Population and Per Capita Revenues of Kiev Rayons
Rayon name Population 
(thousand)
Percent of 
total
Per capita 
budget (UAH)
Percent of 
city average
1 Golosiivskiy 219.1 8.2 985.2 98.5
2 Darnickiy 293.6 11.0 864.4 86.5
3 Desnanskiy 345.1 12.9 750.1 75.0
4 Dniprovskiy 337.3 12.6 902.4 90.3
5 Obolonskiy 308.1 11.5 849.5 85.0
6 Pecherskiy 129.9 4.9 1,225.9 122.6
7 Podilskiy 181.9 6.8 1,188.8 118.9
8 Svyatoshinskiy 319.9 12.0 923.8 92.4
9 Solomyanskiy 317.6 11.9 851.5 85.2
10 Shevchenkiskiy 224.3 8.4 1,962.7 196.3
Total 2,676.8 100.0 999.8 100.0
There is a clear diﬀerence between three central rayons Pecherskiy, Shevchenkiskiy, 
and Podilskiy and the remaining peripheral rayons. The central rayons are the smallest in 
terms of area and population2 and the richest at the same time. The size of Kiev rayons 
ranges from 130,000 inhabitants in Pecherskiy to 345,000 in Desnanskiy. Similarly, 
the richest rayon, Shevchenkiskiy, with a per capita budget of UAH 1,962 is more than 
two and a half times richer than the poorest Desnanskiy rayon with per capita budget 
of UAH 750. 
It is, however, unsurprising that the smallest rayons are at the same time the richest, 
while the largest are the poorest. The three small rayons are all located in the center of 
the city, have relatively few inhabitants, and at the same time have the largest share of 
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institutions and enterprises. The inhabitants of peripheral rayons, often referred to in 
Kiev as spalniye rayoni (sleeping rayons), will usually work in the central rayons. Since 
the tax code of Ukraine assigns collected taxes to the municipality where the employer 
is registered and not to the municipality where the tax payer lives, these central rayons 
have large tax revenues, while larger peripheral rayons like Desnanskiy and Darnickiy 
have few companies and therefore lower tax revenues. As Table 1.2 shows, tax revenues 
are the main item of the revenue side of rayon budgets (with the single exception of 
Shevchenkiskiy rayon). This explains high per capita budgets of the central areas of Kiev 
and low budgets in the periphery. As we discuss in the following section (see Table 1.3), 
the Kiev city uses a very strong equalization mechanism to oﬀset these inequalities. 
Figure 1.1
Administrative Map of Kiev
Note: The rayons are numbered as in Table 1.1
However, Kiev rayons are almost fully responsible for ﬁnancing of all Kiev schools,3 
as Table 1.5 shows. Moreover it also demonstrates that education is the main expendi-
5B e t w e e n  C i t y  a n d  R a y o n s
ture assignment of the rayons (again with the single exception of Shevchenkiskiy). This 
provides a serious challenge to education ﬁnance equity in Kiev. 
The city understands this challenge and responds it through the deﬁnition of city-
wide ﬁnancial normatives of budget needs, discussed later in Section 3 (see Table 1.15). 
Nevertheless, the relative independence of the rayon budgets and the somewhat unclear 
function of the city normatives mean that the results of this strategy are not as complete 
as the city probably hopes. The rayons are owners of school facilities, they set school 
budgets, and make the decisions on school networks (subject to approval by the Main 
Education Department). However, the director of the school, who executes the budget 
established and approved by the rayon Education Department, is appointed by the 
Main Education Department. Thus, the school director is suspended between the city 
and the rayons, which do not always manage to come to full agreement. 
The focus of the present report is the relationship between the city and the rayons 
in the management of education and the eﬀects it has on the city education system. 
The main institutions are the Main Education Department and the Main Finance 
Department of the city, as well as their equivalent at the level of rayons, namely the 
rayon Education Departments and Finance Departments. 
In Section 1 we discuss the budgets of the city and the 10 rayons. A brief review of 
the city education system, including the migration of students across rayon boundaries, 
is provided in Section 2. The ﬁnal section discusses the ﬁnancing of schools by Kiev 
rayons. Annex A discusses the three formulas for normative education expenditures used 
in Ukraine to determine the equalization grants. Annex B provides a short review of 
the speciﬁc Ukrainian division of the budgets into general and special funds. Sources of 
statistical data are listed in the References. 
Two important limitations of the present report need to be mentioned. One is 
related to the absence of any discussion of private funds (parental contributions) in 
public schools. The other is that no school-level analysis is conducted; only rayon-level 
data is used. Both issues require more eﬀort and additional information. 
I have proﬁted from many useful discussions with Lilia Mihailivna Hrinevich, 
Nadezhda Mihailivna Oliferenko, Svitlana Mihailivna Shevchenko, Svitlana Yurievna 
Kolesnikova, and Svitlana Viktorievna Prohorenko. 
CITY AND RAYON BUDGETS 
The consolidated budget of Kiev includes 10 rayon budgets and the budget of the city. 
The budget revenues of these 11 budgets in 2007 are listed in Table 1.2. 
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Table 1.2
Revenues of Kiev Rayons and City (2007), UAH Million
Rayon name Revenues
Tax Non-tax Capital Categorical Equalization Subvention Other Total
1 Golosiivskiy 140 30 17 9 19 216
2 Darnickiy 190 16 11 14 23 254
3 Desnanskiy 193 22 4 15 25 259
4 Dniprovskiy 208 31 15 0 18 32 304
5 Obolonskiy 195 17 8 1 15 26 262
6 Pecherskiy 93 31 10 8 17 159
7 Podilskiy 136 23 25 1 10 21 216
8 Svyatoshinskiy 199 17 19 15 16 29 296
9 Solomyanskiy 171 19 42 0 13 25 270
10 Shevchenkiskiy 152 200 40 8 13 28 440
Total rayons 1,678 406 191 25 132 245 2,676
City of Kiev 6,630 344 1,563 1,173 2,088 1,667 13,465
City consolidated 8,308 749 1,754 1,199 2,088 1,667 15,764
The following comments are necessary to understand Table 1.2: 
 • Table 1.2 includes both a general fund and a special fund part of the budget.4 
In 2007, the general fund revenues of the 10 rayons were equal to UAH 2,130 
million (79.6 percent of the total), while general fund revenues of the city budget 
was UAH 8,948 million (66.5 percent of the total). 
 • Of the tax revenues (budget code 10,000,000), the main is the revenue from 
personal income tax (tax on revenues of physical persons). According to the 
Budget Code (Article 65), 100 percent of this tax stays in the city of Kiev. 
However, the Kiev city council in its yearly budgets decides on the division 
of this tax between the rayon budgets and the city budget. The percentage of 
personal income tax that stays in the rayon budget depends on the rayon and 
may be diﬀerent every year. The city uses this freedom to create a strong ﬁscal 
equalization instrument. In 2007, it ranged between 1.5 percent in Pecherskiy 
and 56.8 percent in Desnanskiy (see Table 1.3). Analogously, 100 percent of 
the land tax stays in the city of Kiev (Budget Code, Article 69), but the city 
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assigns some share of this tax to remain in the rayons budget. In 2007, this 
share ranged between one percent in Pecherskiy and 90 percent in Darnickiy 
and Desnanskiy, see Table 1.3. 
 • Non-tax revenues (budget code 20,000,000), include fees and charges, part of 
the revenues of state or communal companies transferred to local governments, 
as well as own revenues of communal institutions. 
 • Capital revenues (budget code 30,000,000) come mostly from the sale of com-
munal land. 
 • Categorical funds (budget code 50,000,000) are revenues from speciﬁc programs 
of the state budget, but also include some local charges and revenues from the 
sale of some parts of communal buildings. 
 • For each rayon, an equalization grant (“dotation”) is set by the city according to 
the national formula and transferred from the city budget to rayon budgets. It 
is therefore not included in the consolidated budget of the city. Note, however, 
that at the same time the city uses a much stronger equalization instrument, 
discussed in Table 1.3. 
 • It is important to realize that every year the city of Kiev, as a very rich jurisdic-
tion, pays to the state budget (into the national equalization pool) a large sum of 
funds. In 2007, this amounted to UAH 2,744 million, which was 17.5 percent 
of the consolidated city budget. 
 • “Subventions” in the Ukrainian budget terminology are targeted grants. They 
come from the city budget to the rayon budgets and are thus not included in 
the consolidated budget. Two subventions are deﬁned in the general fund: for 
payment of debts to teachers for salaries unpaid in the 1990s and for the reno-
vation of street networks. The following subventions are deﬁned in the special 
fund: for renovation of facilities of social assistance (World Bank project), three 
subventions for education (computerization, preschool investments, and school 
investments, see table below), for the city investment project, Your House, Your 
Courtyard (this is by far the largest subvention), and for investments in rayon 
administration oﬃces. 
 • “Other revenues” include UAH 666 million of revenues from active opera-
tions (revenues from bank transactions), and UAH 1,000 million transferred 
from the general fund of the budget into the special fund of the budget. This 
amount also appears as expenditures of the general fund. Technically speaking, 
it should not be included in either the revenues or expenditures, since it is a 
technical transfer between two parts of the same budget. This would reduce the 
consolidated budget of the city to 14,764 million. 
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As mentioned above, the city decides on what share of personal income tax and of 
land tax will remain in the rayon budgets for each year and for each rayon. For example, 
Shevchenkiskiy rayon kept six percent of personal income tax collected on its territory 
and 30 percent of the land tax in 2006. In 2007, these were reduced to 2.8 percent and 
11 percent respectively. These shares are published in the yearly budget of Kiev city. 
They are listed in Table 1.3 for 2007. 
Table 1.3
Rayon Shares of PIT and Land Tax in 2007
Rayon name Percent of personal income tax Percent of land tax
1 Golosiivskiy 6.8 50.0
2 Darnickiy 43.0 90.0
3 Desnanskiy 56.8 90.0
4 Dniprovskiy 38.0 50.0
5 Obolonskiy 28.2 50.0
6 Pecherskiy 1.5 1.0
7 Podilskiy 16.0 50.0
8 Svyatoshinskiy 29.9 50.0
9 Solomyanskiy 13.0 50.0
10 Shevchenkiskiy 2.8 11.0
Total rayons (average) 12.4 43.0
City of Kiev 87.6 57.0
Table 1.3 indicates that the Kiev city councils makes a serious eﬀort to equalize 
the tax revenues of diﬀerent rayons, by assigning to the rayon budget higher share of 
personal income tax and of land tax in poor rayons, such as Desnanskiy and Darnickiy, 
and much lower share in rich rayons, such as Pecherskiy and Shevchenkiskiy. Without 
this eﬀort the diﬀerences in per capita budgets of Kiev rayons would be much higher 
than those reported in Table 1.1. For example, an increase of the share of personal in-
come tax remaining in Shevchenkiskiy rayon budget to 10 percent would have resulted, 
in the conditions of 2007, in the increase of rayon revenues by UAH 141 million, or 
by 32 percent of all the revenues. At the same time, however, Table 1.3 proves that the 
budgetary independence of the rayons is quite limited, as the city can unilaterally adjust 
and change their main sources of rayon revenues. 
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Interestingly, Table 1.3 shows that, according to the Main Finance Department 
of the city, Podilskiy rayon is relatively poorer than Golosiivskiy, as it retains a higher 
percentage of personal income tax. This means that the division of rayons into the three 
rich central rayons and the poorer peripheral rayons, discussed in the introduction, is 
not an absolute one. 
A review of Table 1.2 shows that the rayon budgets form a very limited part of the 
consolidated city budget, at just under 17 percent. Most of the city expenditures are 
managed directly by the city. Thus social protection, health, roads, buildings and similar 
city functions are the responsibility of the city authorities and are ﬁnanced directly by 
the city. There is only one major function delegated to the rayons, education, as we 
discuss in detail below (see Table 1.5). 
The following Table 1.4 provides the structure of revenues of all rayons and of the city. 
Table 1.4
Structure of Revenues of Kiev Rayons and City (2007)
Rayon name Revenues (percent)
Tax Non-tax Capital Categorical Equalization Subvention Other
1 Golosiivskiy 64.9 14.1 7.9 4.3 8.7
2 Darnickiy 74.9 6.2 4.4 5.6 8.9
3 Desnanskiy 74.4 8.6 1.5 5.6 9.8
4 Dniprovskiy 68.4 10.1 4.9 0.1 5.9 10.6
5 Obolonskiy 74.7 6.5 3.1 0.4 5.6 9.7
6 Pecherskiy 58.6 19.4 6.3 5.3 10.5
7 Podilskiy 62.8 10.5 11.6 0.4 4.8 9.9
8 Svyatoshinskiy 67.4 5.7 6.4 5.1 5.4 9.9
9 Solomyanskiy 63.2 7.1 15.4 5.0 9.2
10 Shevchenkiskiy 34.5 45.3 9.1 1.8 2.9 6.4
Total rayons 62.7 15.2 7.1 0.9 4.9 9.2
City of Kiev 49.2 2.6 11.6 8.7 15.5 12.4
City consolidated 52.7 4.8 11.1 7.6 13.2 10.6
We see that tax revenues of all rayons are between 60 percent and 75 percent 
with the single exception of Shevchenkiskiy rayon with very high non-tax revenues. 
Shevchenkiskiy rayon is rather unique in having very high non-tax revenues; as Table 
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1.2 shows it collects half of all non-tax revenues in the rayons. These revenues include 
UAH 45 million from rent of communal buildings (in the general fund) and UAH 
61 million of own revenues of city rayon institutions, also probably due to rent (in the 
special fund). This source of revenues is not available to peripheral rayons. Note also 
that the prominence and distribution of revenues from taxes are largely due to the city 
decisions on the allocation of personal income tax and of land tax between the rayon 
and city budget, as described in Table 1.3. 
Overall, transfers from the city budget form only 14.1 percent of rayon revenues. 
These include 4.9 percent of equalization transfers and 9.2 percent of subventions. 
Finally, we turn to the position of education expenditures in the city budget. We 
provide not only the budget expenditures and how they are distributed across the 10 
rayons and the city, but also the share of education in the respective budget (the break-
down of education budgets into more detailed budget categories is discussed below, 
see Table 1.18). 
Table 1.5
Overall Education Expenditures of Kiev Rayons and City (2007), UAH Million
Rayon name Education 
expenditures
Share of all education 
expenditures
Share of total 
rayon/city budget
1 Golosiivskiy 119.49 7.1% 55.4%
2 Darnickiy 170.47 10.1% 67.2%
3 Desnanskiy 177.75 10.5% 68.7%
4 Dniprovskiy 184.31 10.9% 60.5%
5 Obolonskiy 163.71 9.7% 62.5%
6 Pecherskiy 69.16 4.1% 43.4%
7 Podilskiy 118.47 7.0% 54.8%
8 Svyatoshinskiy 176.52 10.4% 59.7%
9 Solomyanskiy 144.35 8.5% 53.4%
10 Shevchenkiskiy 144.49 8.5% 32.8%
Total rayons 1,468.72 86.7% 54.9%
City of Kiev 225.06 13.3% 1.7%
City consolidated 1,693.78 100.0% 10.7%
Table 1.5 shows that rayons are responsible for over 86 percent of all education 
budgets in the city. Of the education budget of the city, UAH 160 million is for technical-
professional education, higher education, and post-diploma education. 
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Table 1.5 also conﬁrms that education is indeed the main function of the rayons. 
With the exception of Shevchenkiskiy and Pecherskiy rayon, education is over half of 
the rayon budget, coming close to 70 percent in Desnanskiy and Darnickiy. At the same 
time, education is only 1.7 percent of the city budget, even including professional and 
higher education. 
The following Table 1.6 lists speciﬁc subventions from the city to rayon budgets in 
the education sphere. 
Table 1.6
Education Subventions to Kiev Rayons, UAH Thousand
Rayon name Computerization of 
schools
Investments in 
preschools
Investments in schools
1 Golosiivskiy 889 2,153 1,906
2 Darnickiy 1,707 3,097 2,365
3 Desnanskiy 1,809 5,210 1,517
4 Dniprovskiy 1,740 2,219 2,315
5 Obolonskiy 1,245 2,126 2,742
6 Pecherskiy 428 2,078
7 Podilskiy 1,209 2,326 2,451
8 Svyatoshinskiy 1,931 2,911 2,532
9 Solomyanskiy 1,316 2,671 2,176
10 Shevchenkiskiy 1,380 1,063 3,943
Total rayons 13,654 23,776 24,025
Altogether, the three education subventions to Kiev rayons amount to UAH 61 
million, or about 25 percent of all the subventions. They also form about four percent 
of all education expenditures of rayons. 
We conclude this section with a discussion of a common misconception that the 
city allocates speciﬁc funds to rayons for education. As we have seen in the budgets 
of the rayons and of the city, no such transfer of funds for education exists (it would 
appear as expenditure of city budget and as revenue in rayon budgets). There are a few 
targeted subventions for speciﬁc education programs, listed in Table 1.6, but these are 
relatively small and by deﬁnition of subvention cannot be used to ﬁnance recurrent 
expenditures in rayon schools. 
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Nevertheless, the Main Finance Department is closely involved in assessing the 
budget needs of all rayons, because it has to decide on the shares of personal income 
tax and land tax which stay at the rayon level (see Table 1.3) (and also on the equaliza-
tion dotation, serving largely the same purpose). In order to do this, the city assesses 
expenditure needs of the rayons for all their responsibilities, and also their prospective 
revenues, and on this basis sets the shares of retained taxes. As we have seen from Table 
1.5, this means ﬁrst of all assessing expenditure needs in education. The Main Finance 
Department certainly uses some methodology for assessing this5 and on its basis decides 
on the level of revenues for the next budget year. Since the methodology is not publicly 
known, the assessments of the Main Finance Department cannot be independently 
veriﬁed and critically discussed. 
Thus it seems true to say that the city decides on the overall level of rayon revenues, 
but not on the way those revenues are used. No speciﬁc ﬂow of funds to the rayon 
budgets is calculated on the basis of student numbers or is intended to ﬁnance recur-
rent school expenditures. 
EDUCATION SYSTEM OF KIEV CITY
The education system of the city of Kiev includes the following institutions: 
 • Preschools owned and ﬁnanced by the rayons. 
 • Secondary schools6 owned and ﬁnanced by the rayons with the exception of 
an Olympic sports boarding school and a distance-learning school (for grades 
eight to twelve), for both of which the city is the founder. 
 • Professional-technical schools PTU, covering grades ten to twelve (27 institu-
tions), owned and ﬁnanced by the city. 
 • Kiev city municipal pedagogical university owned and ﬁnanced by the city. 
 • Teacher Institute, responsible for in-service training of teachers, owned and 
ﬁnanced by the city. 
 • Two institutions of extra school education (focusing on art subjects and on 
tourism), owned and ﬁnanced by the city. 
There also are a large number of higher education institutions as well as four PTUs, 
owned and ﬁnanced directly by the Ministry of Education and by some other ministries. 
The present report focuses on secondary schools, and therefore on the managerial and 
ﬁnancial responsibilities of rayons. 
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In the following tables we provide the numbers of students of secondary schools 
in 2007, broken down by rayon and by school type. We divide all Kiev schools into 
four types: 
 1) Regular general education schools, called regular. 
 2) Schools organized together with preschools, typically providing education only 
for the ﬁrst four grades and aimed at providing a safe and familiar teaching 
environment, called below schools with preschools, abbreviated to W/preschools.7 
 3) Boarding schools, including general boarding schools, special boarding schools, 
boarding schools for orphans, and sanatorium schools, called boarding. 
 4) Specialized schools, including schools with deepened study of some subjects 
and the new type schools (gymnasium, lyceum), called specialized. 
The above classiﬁcation of Kiev schools is based on the assessment that the diﬀerences 
between regular and specialized schools are important and should be monitored by the 
city. It is worth pointing out that the process of transformation of a regular secondary 
school into a specialized school is largely governed by rayon authorities, through the 
accreditation procedure, although the ﬁnal approval comes from the Main Education 
Department. For example, Obolonskiy rayon has an expressed policy of changing all 
their secondary schools and obtaining the status of specialized ones. The accreditation 
process required for the change of school status is seen as an important instrument of 
enhancing education quality. Moreover, the specialized schools have enhanced curriculum 
(additional lessons chosen according to school specialization), and the teachers receive 
a ten-percent increase of their salaries,8 in addition to the 20-percent increase above the 
national teacher pay scale given to all Kiev teachers. 
Boarding schools have of course higher recurrent costs due to expenditures on 
boarding. Schools with preschools often provide additional care for very young students, 
including food (which is prepared together with the food for the associated preschool). 
Table 1.7 displays the number of schools belonging to these four types in each rayon. 
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Table 1.7
Kiev Schools by Type and Rayon
Rayon name Regular Specialized Boarding W/preschool All
1 Golosiivskiy 18 13 3 4 38
2 Darnickiy 14 19 2 12 47
3 Desnanskiy 34 12  16 62
4 Dniprovskiy 25 23 3 9 60
5 Obolonskiy 21 15 5 5 46
6 Pecherskiy 9 15   24
7 Podilskiy 13 12 4 10 39
8 Svyatoshinskiy 20 16 2 12 50
9 Solomyanskiy 20 21 4 12 57
10 Shevchenkiskiy 12 24 4 7 47
Total 186 170 27 87 470
Interestingly, there are already more specialized schools than general secondary 
schools in Kiev, which indicates the rapid movement toward new school types (gymnasia, 
lyceums, as well as schools with deepened study of certain subjects, notably languages). 
This is even more apparent when we consider the number of students in each school 
type, by rayon, in Table 1.8. 
Table 1.8
Students in Kiev Schools by Type and Rayon
Rayon name Regular Specialized Boarding W/preschool All
1 Golosiivskiy 9,325 8,142 523 344 18,334
2 Darnickiy 9,225 18,295 165 1,022 28,707
3 Desnanskiy 19,216 8,403  1,687 29,306
4 Dniprovskiy 15,251 14,798 613 997 31,659
5 Obolonskiy 13,713 11,272 744 427 26,156
6 Pecherskiy 4,428 9,142   13,570
7 Podilskiy 6,644 8,313 822 1,050 16,829
8 Svyatoshinskiy 12,672 14,225 466 1,079 28,442
9 Solomyanskiy 9,571 11,875 662 1,124 23,232
10 Shevchenkiskiy 6,826 12,399 778 469 20,472
Total 106,871 116,864 4,773 8,199 236,707
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Over half of all students in Kiev attend specialized secondary schools. The number 
of boarding school students is very small, while a minority of nearly 4.4 percent attends 
schools with preschools. However, the shares of students attending diﬀerent school types 
vary signiﬁcantly among the rayons, as Table 1.9 shows. 
Table 1.9
Students in Kiev Schools (Structure in Rayons)
Rayon name Regular Specialized Boarding W/preschool
1 Golosiivskiy 50.9% 44.4% 2.9% 1,9%
2 Darnickiy 32.1% 63.7% 0.6% 3,6%
3 Desnanskiy 65.6% 28.7%  5,8%
4 Dniprovskiy 48.2% 46.7% 1.9% 3,1%
5 Obolonskiy 52.4% 43.1% 2.8% 1,6%
6 Pecherskiy 32.6% 67.4%   
7 Podilskiy 39.5% 49.4% 4.9% 6,2%
8 Svyatoshinskiy 44.6% 50.0% 1.6% 3,8%
9 Solomyanskiy 41.2% 51.1% 2.8% 4,8%
10 Shevchenkiskiy 33.3% 60.6% 3.8% 2,3%
Total 45,1% 49.4% 2.0% 3.5%
Table 1.9 is interesting in a number of respects. First, we note that the distribution 
of students in schools with preschools varies from zero percent in Pecherskiy rayon 
to over six percent in Podilskiy rayon. As both of these are rich central rayons, and as 
among poorer peripheral rayons we also see some with a relatively high share of students 
in schools with preschools (such as Desnanskiy), and some with a low share (such as 
Golosiivskiy), we conclude that each rayon has its own policy regarding these schools, 
probably to some extent inﬂuenced by the pressure from parents and by the availability 
of the appropriate facilities.9 
Even more interesting is the distribution of students between general and special-
ized secondary schools. We mentioned above that Obolonskiy rayon has a policy of 
transforming all its schools into specialized schools. Table 1.7 and Table 1.9 show that 
it has a long way to go, while Pecherskiy and Darnickiy rayon are most advanced on 
this path. The smallest share of students in specialized schools, at 29 percent, is in 
Desnanskiy rayon, which we recall is also the poorest (see Table 1.1). Among the central 
rayons Podilskiy rayon seems exceptional in having the relatively low share of 50 percent 
of students in specialized schools. However, this is the rayon with the highest share of 
students of boarding schools, ﬁve percent, and of students in schools with preschools. 
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If we take into consideration only the regular and specialized schools in Podilskiy, we 
see that 56 percent of students attend the specialized schools. 
For a comparable picture of all rayons, in the following Figure 1.2 we exclude from 
analysis boarding schools and schools with preschools, and we locate each rayon by its 
per capita revenues (from Table 1.1) and share of students of specialized schools (among 
students of regular and specialized schools, from Table 1.8). 
Figure 1.2
Rayons with Per Capita Revenues and Share of Students in Specialized Schools
We note that apart from the Shevchenkiskiy rayon, which as the richest is an 
isolated outlier, there is a tendency of richer rayons to have more specialized schools. 
The correlation coeﬃcient of the two variables is R = 0.59 (with Shevchenkiskiy rayon 
excluded). This implies that richer rayons may provide more help to their schools to 
pass through the accreditation process. 
Table 1.7 and Table 1.8 allow us to obtain the information about school size (the 
average number of students in the school). 
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Table 1.10
Average School Size by Type and Rayon
Rayon name Regular Specialized Boarding W/preschool All
1 Golosiivskiy 518 626 174 86 482
2 Darnickiy 659 963 83 85 611
3 Desnanskiy 565 700  105 473
4 Dniprovskiy 610 643 204 111 528
5 Obolonskiy 653 751 149 85 569
6 Pecherskiy 492 609   565
7 Podilskiy 511 693 206 105 432
8 Svyatoshinskiy 634 889 233 90 569
9 Solomyanskiy 479 565 166 94 408
10 Shevchenkiskiy 569 517 195 67 436
Total 575 687 177 94 504
It is unsurprising that boarding schools are on average much smaller than regular 
and specialized schools. Even smaller are the schools with preschools. This again testiﬁes 
to their speciﬁc role in maintaining a friendly secure atmosphere for their students.10 
However, the size of these schools varies with the rayon. 
The relative size of regular and specialized schools merits deeper review. Overall, 
specialized schools are larger by over 100 students, or by nearly 20 percent, compared to 
the regular schools. This is especially evident in some peripheral rayons like Svyatoshin-
skiy and Darnickiy in which specialized schools have on average over 800 students and 
are larger than regular schools by over 200 students. This implies a huge demand for 
places in these schools. This was conﬁrmed in discussions with directors of specialized 
Kiev schools, which operate above their capacity, with overloaded classes. Table 1.11 
provides the number of classes in Kiev schools by school type and by rayon and Table 
1.12 presents the average class sizes. 
18
T W O  S T U D I E S  O F  E D U C A T I O N  F I N A N C E  A N D  M A N A G E M E N T  I N  T H E  C I T Y  O F  K I E V
Table 1.11
Classes in Kiev Schools by Type and Rayon
Rayon name Regular Specialized Boarding W/preschool Total
1 Golosiivskiy 365 310 55 16 746
2 Darnickiy 319 692 22 48 1,081
3 Desnanskiy 818 344  89 1,251
4 Dniprovskiy 581 556 53 55 1,245
5 Obolonskiy 549 433 80 24 1,086
6 Pecherskiy 184 334   518
7 Podilskiy 286 316 70 48 720
8 Svyatoshinskiy 498 526 47 50 1,121
9 Solomyanskiy 400 472 82 51 1,005
10 Shevchenkiskiy 290 490 55 27 862
Total 4,290 4,473 464 408 9,635
Dividing data in Table 1.8 by data in Table 1.11, we obtain class sizes. 
Table 1.12
Class Sizes in Kiev Schools by Type and Rayon
Rayon name Regular Specialized Boarding W/preschool Total
1 Golosiivskiy 25.55 26.26 9.51 21.50 24.58
2 Darnickiy 28.92 26.44 7.50 21.29 26.56
3 Desnanskiy 23.49 24.43  18.96 23.43
4 Dniprovskiy 26.25 26.62 11.57 18.13 25.43
5 Obolonskiy 24.98 26.03 9.30 17.79 24.08
6 Pecherskiy 24.07 27.37   26.20
7 Podilskiy 23.23 26.31 11.74 21.88 23.37
8 Svyatoshinskiy 25.45 27.04 9.91 21.58 25.37
9 Solomyanskiy 23.93 25.16 8.07 22.04 23.12
10 Shevchenkiskiy 23.54 25.30 14.15 17.37 23.75
Total 24.91 26.13 10.29 20.10 24.57
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Table 1.12 shows that there is a signiﬁcant variation of average class sizes across 
rayons. The smallest classes with an average size of 23.1 students are in Solomyanskiy 
rayon, and the largest is with an average of 26.6 students in Darnickiy. 
We also see, as expected, that on average classes in specialized schools are larger than 
in regular schools, in some cases by over three students per class. This strengthens the 
conclusion that there is an increasing parental pressure to have their children admitted 
to specialized schools. This leads to excessive size of these schools and also to overload-
ing of their classes. 
We recall, however, that children and young people in Kiev may attend any school 
they choose, on the condition that it ﬁnds places for them (or as Table 1.10 and Table 
1.12 indicate, as long as it is able to put them into an overcrowded class). It is therefore 
very interesting to review the migration of children among the rayons: how massive is 
this migration, from which rayons do children emigrate, and to which rayons do they 
immigrate?11 Unfortunately, Ukrainian schools do not routinely collect information 
about the place of residence of their students (so it is not possible to know from the 
statistical data what percentage of students of a given school come from outside of their 
catchment area, called microrayon in Ukraine), and the breakdown of Kiev population 
by age and by rayon is inaccessible, too.12 Therefore, in order to estimate student migra-
tions across Kiev rayons we need to use some simplifying assumptions. 
Namely, we assume that the number of school aged children per 1,000 inhabitants 
is the same in all Kiev rayons. In fact, we know that this assumption is not fully true. 
In general, the central rayons are likely to be older and with fewer school aged children, 
while young families tend to settle in peripheral rayons. However, as Kiev rayons are 
very large, we can assume that the diﬀerences are not very large. Also we do not con-
sider students coming from outside Kiev and living in boarding schools, but we include 
students in schools with preschools (which in most cases attend the school closest to 
their place of residence, therefore do not migrate).
Comparing data from Table 1.1 and Table 1.7, we see that on average there are 
86.65 students per 1,000 population, with data for rayons presented in Table 1.13.
We ﬁnd the largest number of students per 1,000 population in Pecherskiy rayon at 
121 percent of the city average, in Darnickiy rayon (112 percent), and in Dniprovskiy 
rayon (106 percent). The lowest is in Solomyanskiy rayon at 82 percent of the city aver-
age and in Obolonskiy (95 percent). According to the simpliﬁed methodology we are 
using, these will be the rayons with the largest immigration and emigration of students, 
respectively. Indeed, assuming the actual number of residing children per 1,000 popula-
tion is the same, we explain the diﬀerent numbers of students by student migration. 
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Table 1.13
Number of Students Per 1,000 Population by Rayon
Rayon name Students per 1,000 population Relative to the city average
1 Golosiivskiy 81.29 93.8%
2 Darnickiy 97.21 112.2%
3 Desnanskiy 84.92 98.0%
4 Dniprovskiy 92.04 106.2%
5 Obolonskiy 82.48 95.2%
6 Pecherskiy 104.46 120.6%
7 Podilskiy 88.00 101.6%
8 Svyatoshinskiy 87.45 100.9%
9 Solomyanskiy 71.06 82.0%
10 Shevchenkiskiy 87.80 101.3%
Total 86.65 100.0%
Thus Table 1.14 provides the expected and the actual number of students in each 
rayon (without students of boarding schools), calculates the diﬀerence due to migra-
tion, and estimates it as a percent of residing children for emigration and as a percent 
of enrolled students for immigration. 
Table 1.14
Estimated Migration of Students across Kiev Rayons
Rayon name Estimated
children
Actual
students
Migration
out
Migration
In
Percent of
Children
Percent of
students
1 Golosiivskiy 18,984 17,811 1,173  6.2%  
2 Darnickiy 25,439 28,542  3,103  10.9%
3 Desnanskiy 29,902 29,306 596  2.0%  
4 Dniprovskiy 29,226 31,046  1,820  5.9%
5 Obolonskiy 26,696 25,412 1,284  4.8%  
6 Pecherskiy 11,255 13,570  2,315  17.1%
7 Podilskiy 15,761 16,007  246  1.5%
8 Svyatoshinskiy 27,718 27,976  258  0.9%
9 Solomyanskiy 27,519 22,570 4,949  18.0%  
10 Shevchenkiskiy 19,435 19,694  259  1.3%
Total 231,934 231,934 8,001 8,001 3.4% 3.4%
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We note that according to our simpliﬁed model, 3.4 percent of all Kiev students 
migrate across rayon boundaries. However, the actual situation is quite varied in speciﬁc 
rayons, as Table 1.14 shows. From Solomyanskiy and Obolonskiy rayon about 18 percent 
and ﬁve percent respectively of all children attend schools located in another rayon. 
On the other hand, over 17 percent of students in Pecherskiy rayon and 11 percent in 
Darnickiy rayon come to the rayon schools from other rayons. These are signiﬁcant 
percentages. We may assume but have no way of verifying that most children emigrat-
ing from Solomyanskiy rayon to schools in other rayons get enrolled in Pecherskiy and 
Darnickiy rayons due to the geographical proximity (see Figure 1.1). 
The simpliﬁed model we are using does not allow us to determine which schools 
attract migrating students. However, we suspect that they are more likely to choose spe-
cialized schools. One way to verify this is to analyze the relationship between migration 
and average class size for types of school. To this end, we deﬁne migration level as the 
diﬀerence between the number of students and the number of children, divided by the 
number of children, for every rayon. Figure 1.3 displays all rayons located by migration 
level and average class size of specialized school. 
Figure 1.3
Rayons with Migration Level and Average Class Size of Specialized Schools
We note that there is a clear tendency to form larger classes in those rayons where 
more children are coming. Indeed, the correlation coeﬃcient of the two variables is 
R = 0.62. Thus if there are more incoming students, then the classes of specialized 
schools have to be increased to accommodate them. 
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Figure 1.4 presents the same data for average class sizes of regular schools. 
Figure 1.4
Rayons with Migration Level and Average Class Size of Regular Schools
No such strong tendency as the one visible in Figure 1.3 can be seen here, and 
indeed the correlation ceoﬃcient of the two variables is just R = 0.33. This means that 
incoming students do not overcrowd the classes of regular schools. 
We thus conclude that the signiﬁcant student migration between Kiev rayons has 
as its primary objective enrollment in specialized schools. While this conclusion is obvi-
ous for all professionals responsible for management of education in Kiev, and indeed 
agrees with common sense and with information obtained from school directors, our 
analysis provides some numerical evidence. It also shows that the opinions of the city 
and rayon education departments that specialized schools oﬀer education of higher 
quality is shared by most parents. 
RAYON EDUCATION EXPENDITURES 
The city of Kiev deﬁnes its own ﬁnancial normatives of budget needs in education in-
dependently of the national normatives set on the basis of Decision 1195 and discussed 
in Annex A. The city normatives appear in the justiﬁcation of city draft budgets and 
are calculated on the basis of previous years expenditures by the school type (overall 
expenditures for a given type of schools divided by the number of students), taking 
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into account the inﬂation prognosis and the planned increases of the teacher salary 
pay scale. Their calculation is performed by the Main Finance Department of the city, 
without collaboration or input from the Main Education Department, and is seen as 
a routine application of the rules. Very importantly, there is no decision or document 
by the Kiev City Council deﬁning what ﬁnancial normatives should be used and how 
they should be calculated. This is an own initiative of the Main Finance Department. 
There are ﬁve city normatives, for preschools, general education schools, for general 
and special boarding schools, as well as for orphans. The values in UAH and the rela-
tive values (relative to the general education school normative) of ﬁve normatives of 
budget needs in education, adopted by city of Kiev for 2007 and 2008, are provided 
in the following Table 1.15. 
Table 1.15
Kiev Normatives of Budget Needs in Education in 2007 and 2008
Normative of budget needs 2007 2008 Growth 
2007–08
Value Relative Value Relative
1 Preschool 4,665 177.9% 6,590 164.6% 41.3%
2 General secondary school 2,622 100.0% 4,003 100.0% 52.7%
3 Boarding school 11,963 456.3% 17,512 437.5% 46.4%
4 Special boarding school 16,295 621.5% 23,116 577.5% 41.9%
5 Orphanage 28,315 1,080.0% 42,099 1,051.7% 48.7%
Between 2007 and 2008, the value of the basic normative for general education 
school increased by 53 percent, while for preschools and special boarding schools by 
about 41 percent. This has led to some ﬂattening of the structure (the diﬀerences between 
the normative for general secondary school and other normatives decreased). When we 
compare with Table 1.32 in Annex A, we note that the Kiev preschool normative grew at 
about the same rate as the national preschool normative, but the Kiev secondary school 
normative grew much more than the corresponding national one. 
It is quite interesting that the city decided not to deﬁne the ﬁnancial normative for 
specialized schools (discussed extensively in the previous section), despite their higher 
costs due to higher teacher salaries13 and to enhanced curriculum. The reasons may lie 
in the larger average class size of these schools. As seen in Table 1.12, average class size 
is 23.8 students in regular school and 26 students in specialized school. At the same 
time, teachers earn 10 percent more. If per class expenditures were 10 percent higher 
in specialized schools, then given the larger class sizes their per student costs would be 
higher than in regular secondary schools only by 0.7 percent.14 It seems likely that the 
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Main Financial Department decided that this small diﬀerence does not warrant deﬁning 
an additional ﬁnancial normative. 
The use of the city education normatives in the budgeting process is as follows. On 
the basis of the previous year’s budget execution and taking into account the growth 
of input costs (teacher salaries, energy), the Main Finance Department sets the norma-
tives for the following ﬁnancial year. The normatives are then used to assess the needs 
of rayons, or more properly to set the recommendations to the rayon authorities about 
what they should be spending on education. The recommendations are obtained through 
a formula, in which for each group of education institutions identiﬁed by a separate 
ﬁnancial normative (see Table 1.15), the number of students enrolled in education 
institutions of that group is multiplied by the appropriate normative and the resulting 
amounts are added. These recommended spending levels are then announced to the 
rayon authorities, who are, however, free to allocate to schools less or more than the 
recommendation. However, according to the Main Finance Department, in the few 
years of using the city ﬁnancial normatives there is a tendency of rayons to adhere more 
closely to the recommendations, although rayons still decided to move funds between 
the diﬀerent groups of education institutions. The recommended amounts are also used 
to assess the overall budget needs of rayons, and used to set the levels of personal income 
tax and land tax which stay at the rayon level (see Table 1.3). 
In order to put the Kiev normatives into a national perspective, we compare the 
values of Table 1.15 with the national normatives for the same types of schools, using the 
formulas of Annex A and the coeﬃcients of Table 1.33. As in Table 1.15, we provide the 
values in UAH as well as the values relative to the general education school allocation. 
Table 1.16
National Per Student Values for Five Types of Students in 2007 and 2008
Normative of budget needs 2007 2008
Value Relative Value Relative
 1 Preschool 3,510 156.7% 4,989 172.0%
2 General secondary school 2,240 100.0% 2,901 100.0%
3 Boarding school 13,319 594.5% 17,245 594.5%
4 Special boarding school 17,580 784.8% 22,763 784.8%
5 Orphanage 31,964 1,426.9% 41,387 1,426.9%
The values in Table 1.16 are based on Annex A, with per student allocations for 
preschools being just the national normatives for preschools from Table 1.33. Per stu-
dent allocations for other types of schools use the corrective coeﬃcients in Table 1.29 
as applied to the national secondary school normatives of Table 1.33 as follows: 
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 • general education schools: coeﬃcient Km = 0.841, item 25 of Table 1.29
 • general boarding schools: coeﬃcient Kt = 5, item 10 of Table 1.29 
 • special boarding schools: coeﬃcient Kh = 6.6, item 13 of Table 1.29 
 • orphans: coeﬃcient Kc = 12.02, item 16 of Table 1.29 
The comparison of Table 1.15 and Table 1.16 shows that the city normatives are 
usually but not always higher than the national per student allocation. The following 
Table 1.17 expresses Kiev normatives as percentage of the national per student alloca-
tions in 2007 and 2008. 
Table 1.17
Kiev Normatives as Percent of National Per Student Values in 2007 and 2008
Normative of budget needs 2007 2008
1 Preschool 132.9% 132.1%
2 General secondary school 117.0% 138.0%
3 Boarding school 89.8% 101.6%
4 Special boarding school 92.7% 101.6%
5 Orphanage 88.6% 101.7%
We can now examine how these ﬁnancial normatives deﬁned by the city were in 
practice applied by the rayons, which as discussed before have signiﬁcant although lim-
ited freedom in deciding on the budgets of individual schools. Indeed, it is exactly at 
the rayon level that the allocation of funds on the per student basis using the ﬁnancial 
normatives must be reconciled with the speciﬁc required costs of each school, determined 
in part by the komplectation and tariﬁcation process, in part by other staﬃng norms and 
in part by the previous years’ expenditures on heating, electricity, and similar material 
needs of the school. 
We begin by providing in Table 1.18 the breakdown of the complete education 
budgets of the 10 Kiev rayons in 2007 into main budget lines. Budget codes for speciﬁc 
budget lines are provided in the comments following Table 1.18. 
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Table 1.18
Rayon Education Budgets in 2007 (UAH Million )
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1 Golosiivskiy 36.3 61.7 7.8 2.5 0.4 1.8 9.0 119.5
2 Darnickiy 47.1 100.3 3.0 2.6 3.2 0.5 1.3 12.4 170.5
3 Desnanskiy 53.1 109.8 0.8 3.8 0.6 1.5 8.1 177.7
4 Dniprovskiy 58.4 107.4 0.5 2.4 5.1 3.0 0.8 1.8 4.9 184.3
5 Obolonskiy 51.9 86.1 5.6 4.2 5.2 5.5 0.8 2.2 2.1 163.7
6 Pecherskiy 15.2 44.4 0.2 2.0 0.4 0.8 6.1 69.2
7 Podilskiy 26.8 68.3 1.2 4.5 6.5 2.4 0.3 1.6 6.8 118.5
8 Svyatoshinskiy 48.2 103.8 0.7 7.8 7.4 0.7 3.0 5.0 176.5
9 Solomyanskiy 35.3 82.6 1.4 2.7 3.6 5.7 0.6 1.9 10.4 144.4
10 Shevchenkiskiy 32.2 73.6 3.6 6.6 2.7 1.9 2.7 0.5 1.4 19.4 144.5
Total 402.7 837.9 8.4 21.8 9.9 42.4 38.2 5.7 17.2 84.4 1,468.7
We ﬁrst note that the rayons also pay for preschools (budget code 070101) and for 
the evening schools (budget code 070202), which were not discussed in detail in the 
previous section. A separate budget line of evening schools, with very small amounts, is 
probably an inheritance from the Soviet system where evening classes for workers were 
an important instrument of social advancement. 
General secondary schools (budget code 070201) include expenditures on regular 
as well as on the specialized schools, gymnasia, lyceums, and colleges. Schools with 
preschools are also included here. There are separate budget lines for general boarding 
schools (budget code 070301), boarding schools for orphans (budget code 070302), and 
for special boarding schools (budget code 070304). This reﬂects a long standing tradi-
tion of Soviet education to create schools together with the boarding houses, and thus 
separate general boarding, disabled, or orphaned students from the rest. It is doubtful 
that such separation enhances the life chances of the students of these schools, even if 
the city invests in them. In recent years the city of Kiev is moving to end this practice, 
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beginning with the integration of orphaned students. Thus the number of students of 
these schools has declined considerably (only three such schools remain in Kiev). The 
city has a program to integrate also the students of general boarding schools, as the 
example of boarding school number three in Shevchenkiskiy rayon shows.15 
The remaining identiﬁed budget lines represent expenditures which beneﬁt all stu-
dents, not just students of a speciﬁc category of schools. Extra school activities (budget 
code 070401) are mainly provided through rayon institutions with additional classes 
and non-obligatory courses (there are also two such city institutions, see the previous 
section). Methodological work (budget code 070802) includes expenditures on educa-
tion quality, such as monitoring and visiting of schools, and accreditation of general 
education schools to grant them specialized status. Centralized education accounting 
(budget code 070804) is one of the key functions of the rayon education departments. 
Table 1.19 provides the percentage structure of the rayon education budgets (we 
omit the percent sign for lack of space). 
Table 1.19
Structure of Rayon Education Budgets in 2007 (Percent)
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1 Golosiivskiy 30.3 51.6 6.6 2.1 0.3 1.5 7.5 100.0
2 Darnickiy 27.7 58.8 1.7 1.5 1.9 0.3 0.8 7.3 100.0
3 Desnanskiy 29.8 61.8 0.5 2.1 0.3 0.8 4.6 100.0
4 Dniprovskiy 31.7 58.3 0.3 1.3 2.8 1.6 0.4 1.0 2.7 100.0
5 Obolonskiy 31.7 52.6 3.4 2.6 3.2 3.3 0.5 1.3 1.3 100.0
6 Pecherskiy 22.0 64.2 0.3 2.9 0.6 1.2 8.9 100.0
7 Podilskiy 22.6 57.6 1.0 3.8 5.5 2.1 0.3 1.3 5.8 100.0
8 Svyatoshinskiy 27.3 58.8 0.4 4.4 4.2 0.4 1.7 2.8 100.0
9 Solomyanskiy 24.4 57.2 1.0 1.9 2.5 4.0 0.4 1.3 7.2 100.0
10 Shevchenkiskiy 22.3 50.9 2.5 4.6 1.9 1.3 1.9 0.4 1.0 13.4 100.0
Total 27.4 57.1 0.6 1.5 0.7 2.9 2.6 0.4 1.2 5.7 100.0
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We note that the central rayons of Pecherskiy, Podilskiy, and Shevchenkiskiy spend 
about 22 percent of their total education budget on their preschools, while this share is 
over 30 percent in the peripheral rayons of Golosiivskiy, Dniprovskiy, and Obolonskiy. 
This suggests that the younger families with small children tend to settle or migrate 
to peripheral rayons, while the center of the city has slower population growth and 
birth rates. Evening schools are a very small expenditure item, with the exception of 
Shevchenkiskiy rayon, where they take up 2.5 percent of the education budget. In fact, 
the expenditures of Shevchenkiskiy rayon on evening schools are about 42 percent of 
these expenditures of all the rayons (see Table 1.18), indicating that evening schools are 
predominantly located there. 
In order to analyze per student spending, we need to adopt the classiﬁcation of 
schools reﬂecting the budget lines of Table 1.18. We thus divide the schools into gen-
eral secondary schools, general and special boarding schools, and boarding schools for 
orphans. In particular, general secondary schools include regular and specialized schools, 
as well as schools with preschools. 
The resulting numbers of students in each category, as well as the number of students 
in preschools and in evening schools, are provided in Table 1.20. Data on students in 
preschools and in evening schools were obtained from the Main Education Department. 
Table 1.20
Students by Rayon and by Budget Categories in 2007
Rayon Preschools General 
secondary 
schools 
Evening 
schools
General 
boarding 
schools
Orphanages Special 
boarding 
schools
1 Golosiivskiy 5,930 17,811 66   523
2 Darnickiy 10,530 28,542 248  58 107
3 Desnanskiy 10,906 29,306 409    
4 Dniprovskiy 9,813 31,046 241 217  396
5 Obolonskiy 8,733 25,412  367 92 285
6 Pecherskiy 2,097 13,570 103    
7 Podilskiy 5,303 16,007 605 389  433
8 Svyatoshinskiy 10,013 27,976 418   466
9 Solomyanskiy 6,830 22,570 702 246  416
10 Shevchenkiskiy 5,450 19,694 1,634 560 85 133
Total 75,605 231,934 4,426 1,779 235 2,759
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Thus we can calculate per student expenditures by these types of education institu-
tions, comparing Table 1.18 and Table 1.20. 
Table 1.21
Per Student Expenditures by Rayon and by Budget Categories in 2007
Rayon Preschools General 
secondary 
schools 
Evening 
schools
General 
boarding 
schools
Orphanages Special 
boarding 
schools
1 Golosiivskiy 6,121 3,464    14,914
2 Darnickiy 4,473 3,514   51,724 24,299
3 Desnanskiy 4,869 3,747 1,956    
4 Dniprovskiy 5,951 3,459 2,075 11,060  12,879
5 Obolonskiy 5,943 3,388  15,259 45,652 18,246
6 Pecherskiy 7,248 3,272 1,942    
7 Podilskiy 5,054 4,267 1,983 11,568  15,012
8 Svyatoshinskiy 4,814 3,710 1,675   16,738
9 Solomyanskiy 5,168 3,660 1,994 10,976  8,654
10 Shevchenkiskiy 5,908 3,737 2,203 11,786 31,765 14,286
Total 5,326 3,613 1,898 12,254 42,128 15,368
Table 1.21 is very interesting and deserves some analysis. We ﬁrst note that with the 
exception of general and special boarding schools, the average expenditures per student 
are much higher than the city normatives (see Table 1.16), as reviewed in Table 1.22. 
Please note that the city does not deﬁne the ﬁnancial normative for evening schools, 
so it is omitted from the following table (however, the national formula has a speciﬁc 
correction coeﬃcient for evening schools, see Table 1.29, item 23). 
Table 1.22
Kiev Normatives and Average Per Student Expenditures in 2007
Normative of budget needs Kiev normatives Actual average 
expenditures
Expenditures 
to normatives
1 Preschool 4,665 5,326 114.18%
2 General secondary school 2,622 3,613 137.78%
3 Boarding school 11,963 12,254 102.43%
4 Special boarding school 16,295 15,368 94.31%
5 Orphanage 28,315 42,128 148.78%
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This discrepancy between the ﬁnancial normatives and actual average expenditures 
may have been the reason for the large increase of the Kiev normatives for 2008, 
observed in Table 1.16. The normative for general secondary schools enjoyed the largest 
increase of 52 percent, which is in line with the general secondary schools being funded 
highest above the city normatives (if we discount the three small boarding schools for 
orphans). Indeed, we recall that the Main Financial Department of the city calculates 
the normatives on the basis of last year’s expenditures, taking into account planned 
increases of the teacher salaries as well as inﬂation prognosis. 
It is also useful to review the variation of per student expenditures across Kiev rayons. 
Table 1.23
Cross Variation of Per Student Expenditures by Budget Categories in 2007, in Percent
Rayon Preschools General 
secondary 
schools 
Evening 
schools
General 
boarding 
schools
Orphanages Special 
boarding 
schools
1 Golosiivskiy 114.93 95.89    97.05
2 Darnickiy 83.98 97.27   122.78 158.12
3 Desnanskiy 91.41 103.71 103.06    
4 Dniprovskiy 111.73 95.76 109.32 90.25  83.80
5 Obolonskiy 111.58 93.79  124.52 108.37 118.73
6 Pecherskiy 136.09 90.57 102.31    
7 Podilskiy 94.88 118.11 104.51 94.40  97.68
8 Svyatoshinskiy 90.38 102.70 88.24   108.92
9 Solomyanskiy 97.03 101.30 105.08 89.57  56.31
10 Shevchenkiskiy 110.92 103.45 116.09 96.18 75.40 92.96
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
We note excessive variation of per student expenditures for special boarding schools, 
indicating weakness of data. Interestingly, the variation for the remaining school types 
is more limited, due no doubt to the use of Kiev ﬁnancial normatives as a benchmark 
for all the rayons. This is underlined by the fact that the evening schools, for which the 
ﬁnancial normative has not been deﬁned, exhibit larger variation in per student expen-
ditures than general secondary schools (although lower than preschools). As altogether 
there are only 235 students in boarding schools for orphans in Kiev, we should focus 
on preschools and general secondary schools. 
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For preschools, average per student expenditure varies from UAH 4,473 in Darnickiy 
rayon (84 percent of the city average) to UAH 7,248 in Pecherskiy rayon (136 percent 
of the city average). There is a clear tendency for richer rayons to spend more for their 
preschools, despite the fact that the rich Podilskiy rayon spends relatively little. With-
out Shevchenkiskiy rayon, which is an outlier, the correlation coeﬃcient between per 
student expenditures in preschools and per inhabitant rayon budget (see Table 1.1) is 
R = 0.54. This tendency is illustrated in the following Figure 1.5, where the rayons are 
located by their per inhabitant revenues (X axis) and by their per student expenditures 
for preschools (Y axis). Shevchenkiskiy rayon is marked with a dot. 
Figure 1.5
Rayons with Per Capita Revenues and Per Student Spending for Preschools
For general secondary schools, average per student spending varies from UAH 3,272 
(91 percent of the city average) to UAH 4,267 (118 percent of the city average). There 
is no tendency for richer rayons to spend more per student, as Figure 1.6 shows. 
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Figure 1.6
Rayons with Per Capita Revenues and Per Student Spending for 
General Secondary Schools
Indeed, we note that lowest per student expenditures are in the very rich Pechers-
kiy rayon, while Shevchenkiskiy rayon, by far the richest, spends less per student than 
Desnanskiy rayon, the poorest one. However, we note that per student spending for 
general secondary schools is remarkably uniform across rayons. If we exclude the two 
extreme cases of Podilskiy and Pecherskiy rayons, we see that all the remaining rayons 
spend between UAH 3,400 and UAH 3,800 per student, less than 12 percent diﬀerence. 
We conclude this discussion by stating that the situation of ﬁnancing preschools 
and general secondary schools by the rayons is quite diﬀerent. For preschools, there 
is a tendency for richer rayons to pay more, with the outlying Shevchenkiskiy rayon 
paying 111 percent of the city average. For the general secondary schools, there is a 
signiﬁcant degree of uniformity in the level of per student ﬁnancing across rayons. As 
both preschools and general secondary schools are the property of the rayons, and since 
for both of them the city deﬁnes its ﬁnancial normatives of budget needs, it would be 
interesting to ﬁnd the reasons for these diﬀerences. 
As per student expenditures strongly depend on the class size, and as we know from 
Table 1.12 that class sizes of schools across the rayons vary signiﬁcantly, it makes sense 
to review per class expenditures of the rayons. This data item more accurately reﬂects 
the teaching eﬀort of the schools. We limit our analysis to general secondary schools, 
because we have no access to the number of groups in preschools, the data for general 
and special boarding schools are unreliable (see discussion following Table 1.23), and 
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the number of students in evening schools and in orphanages is too small for statistical 
analysis. 
Table 1.24 provides the average per class expenditures by rayons, in UAH and relative 
to city average. Recall that general secondary schools include, under the classiﬁcation 
used in Section 2, regular and specialized schools and schools with preschools. Therefore 
as the number of classes in general secondary schools, we take the number of classes 
provided in Table 1.11 without the boarding schools. 
Table 1.24
Per Class Expenditures on General Secondary Schools by Rayons
Rayon Per class expenditures (UAH) Relative per class expenditures 
1 Golosiivskiy 89,291 97.7%
2 Darnickiy 94,712 103.7%
3 Desnanskiy 87,770 96.1%
4 Dniprovskiy 90,101 98.6%
5 Obolonskiy 85,586 93.7%
6 Pecherskiy 85,714 93.8%
7 Podilskiy 105,077 115.0%
8 Svyatoshinskiy 96,648 105.8%
9 Solomyanskiy 89,491 97.9%
10 Shevchenkiskiy 91,202 99.8%
Total 91,364 100.0%
We note that the variation between the rayons in per class expenditures in general 
secondary schools are rather small, less than the variation of per student expenditures 
(compare Table 1.23). Nevertheless, a number of open questions remain, of which the 
main one is why the relatively rich Pecherskiy rayon should spend less per class than 
the relatively poor Svyatoshinskiy rayon. 
We now turn to the remaining education expenditures of the rayons, which are 
not linked to speciﬁc school types but beneﬁt all students. In the following Table 1.25, 
we provide per student expenditures on extracurricular activities, on methodological 
work, and on centralized education accounting by rayons, in UAH per student, as well 
as values relative to the city average. It is important to remember that these budget lines 
have a very small share in rayon budgets, with extracurricular activities at 2.6 percent of 
overall rayon education expenditures, methodological work at 0.4 percent and central-
ized accounting at 1.2 percent (see Table 1.19). 
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Table 1.25
Per Student Expenditures on Selected Non-school Functions
Rayon name Extra curriculum Methodological work Centralized accounting
Actual Relative Actual Relative Actual Relative
1 Golosiivskiy 102.8 85.2% 16.4 91.4% 74.0 136.2%
2 Darnickiy 81.0 67.2% 12.7 70.4% 32.9 60.6%
3 Desnanskiy 93.5 77.6% 14.8 82.1% 36.9 68.0%
4 Dniprovskiy 71.9 59.6% 19.2 106.6% 43.2 79.5%
5 Obolonskiy 157.6 130.7% 22.9 127.4% 63.1 116.1%
6 Pecherskiy 126.8 105.2% 25.4 140.9% 50.7 93.4%
7 Podilskiy 105.6 87.5% 13.2 73.3% 70.4 129.6%
8 Svyatoshinskiy 190.4 157.8% 18.0 100.1% 77.2 142.1%
9 Solomyanskiy 185.3 153.6% 19.5 108.4% 61.8 113.7%
10 Shevchenkiskiy 98.0 81.2% 18.1 100.8% 50.8 93.6%
Total 120.6 100.0% 18.0 100.0% 54.3 100.0%
The funds for extracurricular activities, although not very signiﬁcant in the budgets, 
reﬂect well the education priorities of the rayons because they are not governed by strict 
norms and regulations operating in schools, including the ﬁnancial normatives. Per 
student expenditures vary from UAH 72 in Dniprovskiy rayon (at 60 percent of the 
city average) to UAH 190 in Svyatoshinskiy rayon (157 percent of city average). This 
is a very signiﬁcant diﬀerence which raises questions about the quantity and quality of 
services provided by rayons to their students. Interestingly, the rich central rayons of 
Podilskiy and Shevchenkiskiy spend well below the city average, while Pecherskiy rayon 
just above this average. This may reﬂect the fact that city extracurricular institutions 
are predominantly located in the central rayons, so pupils from these schools can use 
the services of city institutions and thus the demand for rayon institutions is limited. 
However, it seems more likely to be an indication of rayon priorities. 
Per student expenditures on methodological work are somewhat less varied across 
rayons, ranging from 70 percent to 141 percent of the city average, with Pecherskiy 
rayon spending most on a per student basis and as proportion of its total education 
budget (Table 1.19). 
We also note that Desnanskiy rayon, which for over 18 years has decentralized 
accounting to the school level, spends relatively little on centralized accounting at 68 
percent of the city average. This may be accounting of preschools and extrecurricular 
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activities. However, Darnickiy rayon, which does not have decentralized accounting to 
schools, spends even less at 61 percent of the city average. Since in Desnanskiy rayon 
all schools have at least one, and very often two accountants, we should have expected 
that expenditures on centralized education accounting there would be minimal. The 
available evidence seems to suggest that decentralization of accounting to schools, al-
though it may bring schools some operational advantages, is not an eﬃcient solution. 
Finally, we discuss education investments in the rayons. Table 1.26 provides the 
investments separately from the general fund and from the special fund of the budget. 
Table 1.26
Education Investments by Rayon (UAH Million)
Rayon Investments from the 
general fund
Investments from the 
special fund
Total investments
1 Golosiivskiy 0.10 5.05 5.15
2 Darnickiy 1.22 7.18 8.40
3 Desnanskiy 3.19 8.70 11.89
4 Dniprovskiy 0.63 7.18 7.81
5 Obolonskiy 4.09 6.13 10.22
6 Pecherskiy 2.26 2.59 4.85
7 Podilskiy 3.51 6.09 9.60
8 Svyatoshinskiy 1.69 7.04 8.73
9 Solomyanskiy 0.02 6.43 6.45
10 Shevchenkiskiy 10.00 6.39 16.39
Total 26.71 62.78 89.49
It is clear that while investments from general funds vary widely across rayons, from 
UAH 20,000 in Solomyanskiy rayon to UAH 10,000,000 in Shevchenkiskiy rayon, the 
range of investment from special funds is much smaller. This is better analyzed in the 
following Table 1.27, where we review these investments per student. Since we include 
preschool investments as well (see Table 1.6), for each rayon we take the number of 
students from Table 1.20, including the students of secondary schools (as in Table 1.8), 
of preschools and of evening schools. 
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Table 1.27
Education Investments Per Student by Rayon (UAH)
Rayon Investments from the 
general fund
Investments from the 
special fund
Total investments
1 Golosiivskiy 4.1 207.6 211.7
2 Darnickiy 30.9 181.8 212.7
3 Desnanskiy 78.5 214.2 292.7
4 Dniprovskiy 15.1 172.1 187.2
5 Obolonskiy 117.2 175.7 292.9
6 Pecherskiy 143.3 164.2 307.5
7 Podilskiy 154.4 267.8 422.2
8 Svyatoshinskiy 43.5 181.1 224.6
9 Solomyanskiy 0.7 209.0 209.7
10 Shevchenkiskiy 362.9 231.9 594.8
Total 84,3 198.2 282.5
We note that per student investment from special funds is remarkably uniform 
across rayons, oscillating around the average value of UAH 198 per student, with the 
highest value in Podilskiy and the lowest in Pecherskiy. We thus see that the city allocates 
carefully its limited investment funds across rayons. However, per student investment 
from general funds oscillates widely, with highest values for the rich central rayons of 
Shevchenkiskiy, Podilskiy, and Pecherskiy, and with Obolonskiy as a close fourth. Thanks 
to the equalizing eﬀect of education subventions, total per student investments are less 
varied, between UAH 187 in Dniprovskiy and UAH 595 in Shevchenkiskiy rayon. 
We recall from Annex B the diﬀerence in the two types of investments. Investments 
from the general fund are ﬁnanced from tax revenues of the rayons, so they reﬂect 
their wealth as well as their own priorities and preferences. The investments from the 
special funds are typically ﬁnanced by subventions. To see this in detail, in Table 1.28 
we provide investments as share of total education expenditures of the rayon, invest-
ments from the special fund as percentage of received education subventions (as listed 
in Table 1.6), and share of education investments from the general fund in total educa-
tion investments of the rayon. 
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Table 1.28
Education Investments Indicators by Rayon
Rayon Investments as percent 
of total education 
expenditures
Investments from 
the special fund as 
percent of received 
subventions
Investments from 
the general fund 
as percent of all 
investments
1 Golosiivskiy 4.3% 102.1% 1.9%
2 Darnickiy 4.9% 100.2% 14.5%
3 Desnanskiy 6.7% 101.9% 26.8%
4 Dniprovskiy 4.2% 114.4% 8.1%
5 Obolonskiy 6.2% 100.3% 40.0%
6 Pecherskiy 7.0% 103.4% 46.6%
7 Podilskiy 8.1% 101.7% 36.6%
8 Svyatoshinskiy 4.9% 95.5% 19.4%
9 Solomyanskiy 4.5% 104.3% 0.3%
10 Shevchenkiskiy 11.3% 100.1% 61.0%
Total 6.1% 102.2% 29.8%
We ﬁrst observe that investments from the special fund are almost equal to the re-
ceived education subvention, including funds for computerization. The only exception is 
Dniprovskiy rayon, which has some extra funds for this purpose in the special fund, and 
Svyatoshinskiy rayon, which strangely spends less than the received categorical subven-
tion (it is possible that they do not record funds spent on computers as investments). 
If education investments from the general fund are free decisions of the rayon council, 
then we clearly see from Table 1.28 that the three rich central rayons of Shevchenkiskiy, 
Pecherskiy, and Podilskiy spend a lot of their own money in the sector. Shevchenkiskiy 
rayon alone spends over 37 percent of all education investments from the general grant, 
which shows that it is indeed relatively very rich. Its overall education investments are 
over 11 percent of its total education budget, a very high ﬁgure. However, we note that 
Obolonskiy rayon with 40 percent of education investments coming from the general 
fund, and to a lesser extent also Desnanskiy rayon with 27 percent, are making a very 
serious eﬀort to improve their education system. And this is especially striking since 
these are the two poorest rayons, as seen in Table 1.1. 
We can conclude that while recurrent expenditures are relatively uniform across the 
rayons, especially as regards general secondary schools, the situation with investments 
is quite diﬀerent. The three education subventions from the city budget to rayons only 
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partially oﬀset the large diﬀerences in rayon wealth, which are clearly visible in their 
per student education investments from the general fund. However, the examples of the 
Obolonskiy and Desnanskiy rayon show that even poor rayons, with strong commitment 
to education, can make an eﬀort to improve conditions in their schools. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Two basic features should characterize strong, autonomous, democratically elected local 
self-governments in the delivery of public services: 
 • the revenues of their budgets depend on work and eﬀorts of their citizens, and
 • the services ﬁnanced from these revenues are provided to their own citizens. 
Only when the two conditions are met can we say that the local government is 
responsible to their electorate for how they use their taxes for their beneﬁt. 
In the case of Kiev rayons, as we have analyzed in the present report, neither of 
these two conditions are met: 
 • the rayon revenues are largely determined by the city council, which every year 
decides what percentages of personal income tax and of land tax stay in the 
rayon budget, separately for each rayon (see Table 1.3), and
 • the natural movement of students between rayons, especially to specialized 
schools, means the services managed and ﬁnanced by the rayons are often 
delivered to citizens of other rayons (see Table 1.14). 
Thus from the ﬁnancial and organizational point of view, Kiev schools form one 
education system, not ten separate education systems in the rayons. Accordingly, the 
management and ﬁnancing of this one single system should be uniform across the rayons, 
subordinated to a clearly formulated education strategy of the city. 
Some elements of such a citywide education strategy are already visible in Kiev, and 
may be listed as follows: 
 1) A number of centrally designed, planned, and executed investment programs 
(see Table 1.6). 
 2) Kiev addition to the salaries of all teachers (20 percent above the national pay 
scale). 
 3) Five ﬁnancial normatives of budget need in education. 
 4) Creation of the Monitoring Center of Kiev Education and publication of ﬁrst 
analyses on education quality.16
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 5) Additional subjects in Kiev schools, including Christian Ethics in Ukrainian 
Literature (grades two to four) and My Kiev (grade seven), taught in schools on 
the basis of textbooks published by the city.17 
All these steps show that the city is undertaking a serious long-term eﬀort to improve 
Kiev education and to adapt it to its needs. 
However, there remains a frustrating mismatch between the need for a uniform 
education strategy and the independent rayon administrations with their exclusive 
responsibility for rayon schools. The Main Education Department should perform the 
following functions in the system: 
 1) Make key decisions in the budgeting process in the area of education. Decide on 
the allocation of funds for education (at least at the rayon level), monitor the 
transfer of these funds to education institutions, and measure the eﬀectiveness 
of their use. 
 2) Maintain a comprehensive database of all education institutions, including their 
students, staﬀ, facilities, education results, and ﬁnances. This database should be 
fully available to the rayon Education Departments, and at least in part to the 
Kiev population. 
 3) Ensure equal treatment of students in all the rayons independently of their relative 
wealth. This includes monitoring access to education, analysis of education 
quality (the task performed by the Center of Monitoring of Kiev Education), 
and controlling the diﬀerences in per student and per class expenditures of 
rayons. 
Maybe the ﬁrst step should be the involvement of the Main Education Depart-
ment in the design, calculation, and implementation of the city ﬁnancial normatives of 
budget needs in education. It is of great interest that the city of Kiev adopts ﬁve such 
normatives and adjusts them from year to year. First, there is no need for the city to 
do this, as the Decision 1195 deﬁnes the ﬁnancial normatives every year for the whole 
country.18 Deﬁning their own education normatives, the Kiev authorities show that they 
take their responsibility for education process in the city seriously, and create a tool for 
expressing their own education strategy. In Section 3, we described the formula used 
by the Main Finance Department which assesses the recommended levels of education 
spending of rayons on the basis of these normatives. 
Second, the decision to use more normatives than are used in the national formula 
(ﬁve normatives in the place of just two) shows that the city has conducted an indepen-
dent analysis of what instruments best serve its needs.19 Although one can discuss the 
necessity of some of these normatives (the normative for boarding schools for orphans 
applies to three schools and 171 students, the normative for general boarding schools 
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applies to six schools with 1,314 students), they represent a potentially useful tool to 
ensure horizontal equity of education ﬁnance.20 
There are nevertheless some problems related to the use of city ﬁnancial normatives:
 1) The city normatives are a policy instrument but are not widely known or un-
derstood in the city apparatus. Even in the Main Education Department it is 
diﬃcult to ﬁnd people who know how the normatives are deﬁned and used. 
The actual values of the normatives appear only in the justiﬁcation of the Kiev 
city budget and are not accessible after the adoption of the budget. Some school 
directors are unaware of them at all.21 
 2) The normatives are internally designed and calculated by the Main Finance 
Department, without collaboration and input from the Main Education Depart-
ment. It thus seems that the key policy instrument in education is not linked 
to any education policy of the city. 
 3) The calculation of the normatives is deﬁned as routine prolongation of last 
year’s expenditures and is performed by the Main Finance Department without 
independent veriﬁcation. This leaves no place for policy analysis of what the 
normatives should be like, for example, how should their relative values change. 
It also exposes the values of the normatives to the impact of own budgetary 
action of the rayons.22 
 4) The number of normatives and the method of setting them are not deﬁned in 
oﬃcial public documents of the city. Thus, the Main Finance Department may 
at any moment change the structure of the normatives or change the system of 
calculating it, undermining the stability of the system and the functioning of 
the normatives. 
 5) The normatives are used only in the preparation of the budget and are forgot-
ten afterwards. They are not used in monitoring the execution of the budget 
or in the analysis of the completed budget. Thus, there is no feedback from the 
critical review of actual budgeting practice. 
These problems of deﬁning and using the normatives have an impact on actual 
budget formation and execution. As our analysis of rayon education budgets in section 
3 shows, city ﬁnancial normatives are not adhered to in the rayons (see Table 1.22), 
and the uniformity of ﬁnancing levels between the rayons, either on a per student basis 
(Table 1.23) or on a per class basis (Table 1.24), has not been fully achieved. Moreover, 
it is an important question whether the relative wealth of the rayons, as indicated by 
their per capita revenues (see Table 1.1), inﬂuences per student spending in education. 
Such an inﬂuence implies horizontal inequity of education ﬁnance in Kiev. The situa-
tion, as reviewed in section 3, is mixed: such inﬂuence appears for preschools (see Figure 
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1.5), but not for general secondary schools (see Figure 1.6). It seems therefore that the 
city had more success in controlling recurrent expenditures in secondary schools than 
in preschools, although the reasons for this diﬀerence remain obscure. An even more 
diﬃcult situation exists with respect to education investments. Investment from spe-
cial funds, governed by education subventions from the city to rayon budget, is quite 
uniform across rayons (see Table 1.27). However, investment from the general fund is 
extremely unequal and reﬂects wealth diﬀerences between the rayons. 
The city needs to develop its own criteria of which diﬀerences in class sizes, teach-
ing hours, student teacher ratios, and per student and per class education expenditures 
across schools and rayons are acceptable, and which need to be addressed with speciﬁc 
interventions. This requires the ability to monitor the performance of the education 
system and also the ability to take eﬀective action. 
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Sources of Statistical Data 
The following sources of statistical and budget data were used in the report: 
 • ZNZ database of city education institutions. This is a Fox Pro database used 
by the Main Education Department. Excel export znzrab.xls was used. ZNZ 
database is used only for purposes of statistical reporting. 
 • Koshtoris.xls, the data ﬁles from all the rayons with complete budget of schools. 
 • The number of preschools and evening schools and their students by rayon were 
provided by Main Education Department of Kiev.
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ANNEX A
Budget Code Formulas for Normative Education Expenditures
The Budget Code of Ukraine of June 21, 2001 demands, in its Article 98, paragraph 
3, that the Cabinet of Ministers adopts a formula to deﬁne the volume of inter-budget 
equalization transfers. That formula was adopted in the Resolution of Cabinet of 
Ministers No. 1195 of September 5, 2001. The formula underwent a number of changes 
over the years.23 
The overall structure of the formula is based on a comparison of normative revenues 
and normative expenditures of each level of government. If the normative expenditures 
are higher than the normative revenues, the local government receives an equalization 
grant, proportional to the diﬀerence between the two. If the normative revenues are 
higher, the local government will pay into the equalization system a proportion of the 
diﬀerence. 
Normative expenditures are calculated separately for a number of sectors, see 
Article 13: 
 • maintenance of local authorities, 
 • health (hospitals, general and specialized clinics), 
 • education (all education with the exception of extracurricular education), 
 • social protection (orphanages, social beneﬁts, housing subsidies, fare subsidies 
for veterans and the elderly), 
 • culture and arts (libraries, museums), 
 • physical culture and sports (recreation centers, sport events, youth sport 
academies), 
 • other expenditures.24 
Some expenditure responsibilities of local governments are not included in the 
calculation of intergovernmental transfers: local ﬁre protection, local programs in the 
sphere of social protection, sport and culture, housing and utilities services, transport 
and communications, construction, and debt service (see Anglichanov et al. 2008). 
For education, there are three separate formulas for normative education expenditures 
depending on the level and type of local government, namely oblasts and the Autono-
mous Republic of Crimea (ARC) (Article 23), for rayons and cities of oblast status25 or 
of ARC status (Article 24), and for the city of Kiev and city of Sevastopol (Article 25). 
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The formula for the oblasts and ARC for 2007 takes the form: 
 
Vo = Ho • (Uo • Kob + Uf • Kf + Uw • Kw + Ugt • Kgt + Ut • Kt + Usi • Ksi + Ugz • Kgz + Uz + 
Uh • Kh + Ugh • Kgh + Ud • Kd + Uc • Kc ) +Vark + Ssst + Sst + Sgd + Vlviv + Vcharkiv
Here Ho is the ﬁnancial normative for budget needs of one student, discussed in 
Table 1.32, and other symbols and coeﬃcients are deﬁned in the following Table 1.29 
and Table 1.30. The formula for rayons and for oblast and ARC status cities in 2007 
takes the form: 
Vo = Hd • (Dm • Knm(r) + Dgm • Kgnm(r) + Ds • Knm(r) + Dgs • Kgnm(r) ) + Ho •  (Ugm • Kgm + Ugmr • 
Kgmr + Ugs • Kgs + Um • Km + Umr • Kmr + Us • Ks + Ubm(r) • Kbm(r) + Ujm(r) • Kj +  Uf • Kf + Uw 
• Kw + Ugt • Kgt + Ut • Kt + Ugz • Kgz + Uz + Uc • Kc ) + Sd + Sgd + Vtzn(r)
Here Ho is the ﬁnancial normative for budget needs of one student, and Hd is the 
ﬁnancial normative for budget needs of a preschool child (see Table 1.32). Coeﬃcients 
Knm(r) and Kgnm(r) represent actual percentages of children attending preschools, not 
located and located in the mountains, and are established for 2008 separately for each 
local government unit in Ukraine. Other symbols and coeﬃcients are deﬁned in Table 
1.29 and Table 1.30. 
The formula for the cities of Kiev and Sevastopol for 2007 takes the form: 
Vokyiv(sev) = Hd • (Dmkyiv(sev) • Knm + Dssev • Knm ) + Ho •  (Ukyiv(sev) • Km + Us • Ks + Ubkyiv(sev) • Kj 
+ Uo • Kob + Uf • Kf + Ut • Kt + Usi • Ksi + Uz + Uh • Kh + Ud • Kd + Uc • Kc ) + Sd +  Ssst +  Sst 
+ Sgd + Vkyiv + Vtznkyiv(sev)
Table 1.29 lists all the factors depending on the ﬁnancial normative of budget needs 
(for students and for preschoolers) used in the three formulas. It provides explanations 
of the factors used and the values of correcting coeﬃcients. 
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Table 1.29
Factors and Coeﬃcients of Allocation Formulas
Symbol Meaning Coefﬁcient
1 Dm Children aged 0-6 in cities not located in the mountains (also for the 
cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol)
Based on actual 
preschool 
enrollment, see 
above. 2 Dgm Children aged 0-6 in cities located in the mountains
3 Ds Children aged 0-6 in villages not located in the mountains (also for 
rural schools in the city of Sevastopol)
4 Dgs Children aged 0-6 in villages located in the mountains
5 Uo Students of all schools on the territory of ARC, oblast, city of Kiev 
and city of Sevastopol (as applicable) 
Kob = 0.092
6 Uf Students, not including the orphans,
26 of general boarding schools 
with increased military-physical education
Kf = 6.5
7 Uw Students, not including orphans, of Olympic sport schools and sport 
boarding schools
Kw = 8.4
8 Ugt Students, not including the orphans, of general boarding schools 
located in the mountains
Kgt = 5.7
9 Ugz Day students
27 of general boarding schools located in the mountains Kgz = 1.1
10 Ut Students of general boarding schools (excluding schools with 
increased military-physical education, sanatorium boarding schools, 
and orphans) 
Kt = 5
11 Usi Students of general sanatorium boarding schools, not including 
orphans
Ksi = 5.4
12 Uz Day students of general boarding schools treated as 1
13 Uh Students, not including orphans, of special boarding schools not 
located in the mountains
Kh = 6.6
14 Ugh Students, not including orphans, of special boarding schools located 
in the mountains
Kgh = 7.5
15 Ud Day students of special boarding schools Kd = 2.5
16 Uc Orphan students fully supported by the state Kc = 12.02
17 Ugm Students of day general secondary schools in cities of oblast status 
located in the mountains 
Kgm = 0.968
18 Ugmr Students of day general secondary schools in cities located in the 
mountains
Kgmr = 1.064
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19 Us Students of general day secondary schools located in villages not 
located in the mountains
See Table 1.31.
20 Ugs Students of day general secondary schools located in villages located 
in the mountains
21 Um Students of day general secondary schools in cities of oblast status 
not located in the mountains
Km = 0.841
22 Umr Students of day general secondary schools in cities not located in the 
mountains 
Kmr = 0.926
23 Ubm(r) Students of evening schools in cities (also in the cities of Kyiv, and 
Sevastopol) Kbm and in rayons Kbr
Kbm = 0.43
Kbr = 0.29
24 Ujm(r) Special schools (special needs students), in cities, rayons, Kyiv and 
Sevastopol
Kj = 2.5
25 Ukyiv(sev) Students of non-rural schools in cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol Km = 0.841
In the three formulas, a number of elements represent lump allocations, calculated 
according to separate rules and not depending on the number of students. They are 
listed in Table 1.30. 
Table 1.30
Lump-sum Elements of Allocation Formulas, Calculated According to Separate Rules
Symbol Meaning
1 Vark Funds for preparation of staff of universities in ARC
2 Ssst Additional 2007 allocation for stipends for university students
3 Sst Additional 2007 allocation for support for purchase of textbooks for some university 
students
4 Ssg Additional 2007 allocation for financial support to orphans who have completed the 
school are employed for the first time
5 Vlviv Funds for preparation of staff of PTU in city of Lviv
6 Vcharkiv Funds for preparation of staff of PTU in city of Charkiv
7 Sd Additional 2007 allocation for financial support to orphans over 18
8 Vtzn(r) Targeted funds for ensuring modern technical equipment for teaching natural, 
mathematical, and technological subjects in rayon schools
9 Vtznkyiv(sev) Targeted funds for ensuring modern technical equipment for teaching natural, 
mathematical, and technological subjects in Kiev and Sevastopol schools
The values of the coeﬃcient Ks for students in village schools not located in the 
48
T W O  S T U D I E S  O F  E D U C A T I O N  F I N A N C E  A N D  M A N A G E M E N T  I N  T H E  C I T Y  O F  K I E V
mountains and of the coeﬃcient Kgs for mountain rural schools depend on the average 
class size, as listed in Table 1.31. 
Table 1.31
Values of the Coeﬃcient for Rural Schools
Average class size in the municipality Coefﬁcient of rural schools
not located in the mountains
Ks
located in the mountains
Kgs
1 above 22.2 1.010 1.162
2 from 17.8 to 22.2 1.178 1.355
3 from 14.8 to 17.8 1.305 1.500
4 from 11.7 to 14.8 1.431 1.645
5 below 11.7 1.684 1.936
The values of the two ﬁnancial normatives of budget needs for 2007 and 2008 are 
provided in following Table 1.32. 
Table 1.32
Financial Normatives of Budget Need (UAH)
The ﬁnancial normative of budget needs Fiscal year 2007 Fiscal year 2008 Percent change 
from 2007 
to 2008
1 Preschool 3,510.4 4,989.2 42.1%
2  Secondary school 2,663.7 3,448.9 29.5%
We see that between 2007 and 2007 the ﬁnancial normative of budget needs of 
preschool student grew by over 40 percent, while of secondary school student grew by 
less than 30 percent. As a result, in 2008 the preschool normative is 45 percent higher 
than the secondary school normative, while in 2007 it was only 132 percent higher. 
Finally, for an understanding of the degree of year to year changes in the three 
formulas, we comment on the formulas for 2004 and for 2008:28 
 • The formulas in 2003 had the same structure and coeﬃcients as the formula 
for 2007, described above, except for the following diﬀerences: 
  – For preschools, there was no distinction between the rural and city 
preschools. 
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  – The value of the coeﬃcient Kob (item 5 of Table 1.29) was Kob = 0.072.
  – In place of the coeﬃcient Kob = 12.02 for orphans, irrespective of the 
type of the school which they attend (item 16 of Table 1.29), the 2003 
formula used a coeﬃcient Kp = 10 speciﬁcally for boarding schools 
for orphans. Additionally, the formula used coeﬃcient Kc = 13 for homes 
for children, Kcg = 14.8 for homes for children located in the mountains, 
and Ka = 6.5 for homes of children of family type. 
 • The formulas in 2008 are essentially exactly as in 2007, but the value of the 
coeﬃcient Kob (see item 5 of Table 1.29) was decreased to Kob = 0.072.
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ANNEX B
General and Special Funds in Ukrainian Budget System 
According to the Ukrainian budget classiﬁcation (Budget Code, Article 13), the budget is 
divided into the general and special fund, both on the revenue side and on the expenditure 
side, and the two parts of the budget need to be balanced (see: Anglichanov et al. 2008). 
Overall, the general fund includes taxes and some other revenues. It is designed 
for delegated expenditure responsibilities (these are the expenditures included in the 
calculation of intergovernmental transfers, see Annex A). 
The special fund includes targeted grants (subventions) for investments and own 
revenues of local governments (dividends, sale of property, revenues from capital, rent of 
municipal properties, own revenues of local institutions, borrowings). See, for example, 
Table 1.6. The main purpose of the special fund is to ﬁnance the so-called development 
budget (Budget Code, Article 71), which is mainly investment programs and contribu-
tions of local budgets to equity of communal enterprises. 
Regarding municipal debt, the general fund is used to pay the interest, while the 
special fund is used to pay back the principal debt amount. 
It is possible to deﬁne a transfer from the general fund to the special fund part of 
the budget, but not in the other direction. In this case, the appropriate amount appears 
as revenues in the special fund under the budget code (“other revenues”), and also as 
expenditures in the general fund of the budget, under the budget code. This account-
ing convention allows to correctly verify whether the budget is balanced separately in 
the general fund and in the special fund. At the same time, however, it has the eﬀect 
of inﬂating the budgets by the amount of the transfer from the general to the special 
fund, as the following example shows. 
Suppose for simplicity that the general revenues of a city are UAH 10 million (from 
personal income tax), and special revenues of the city are UAH two million (from sale 
of land), and the city decided to transfer one UAH million to the special fund for 
development funds (investments). The actual total revenues and expenditures of the 
city are of course equal to UAH 12 million. However, in the budget we will see the tax 
revenues of 10 million in the general fund, and we will see the revenues of UAH three 
million in the special fund (UAH two million from sale of land and UAH one million 
in “other” category from the internal transfer). Thus the overall revenues recorded in 
the budget will be UAH 13 million.29 
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NOTES
1 Because the analysis of the present report is for ﬁscal year 2007, budget data and education 
statistical data used in Table 1.1 and below are for 2007. However, population data are from 
2006 (SSO 2007). The budget documents with budget data and the sources of statistical 
data used in the report are listed in the references. The exchange rate of the euro to the 
Ukrainian hryvna on June 30, 2007, was EUR 1 = UAH 7.10. 
2 Only the peripheral rayon Golosiivskiy (1) has the population similar to that of Shevchenkiskiy. 
3 The city is responsible only for professional schools PTU, a few universities, and just a few 
secondary schools (see Section 2). 
4 See Annex B for a review of general and special funds of Ukrainian budgets. 
5 I have not seen any documents describing this methodology. It seems likely that the Main 
Finance Department is using the formulas adopted by the Ministry of Finance in its Decision 
1195, recalled in Annex A. It is also possible that the Main Finance Department is using 
the city ﬁnancial normatives discussed in Section 3. 
6 Here, it is important to stress that the secondary schools, in Ukrainian terminology inherited 
from the Soviet Union, are the schools including grades one to eleven (to twelve in the next 
school year). 
7 However, there is a growing number of so-called education-caring complexes, which are schools 
with preschools in which the education extends beyond the ﬁrst four grades. We classify the 
two types together.
8 It is worth pointing out that the 10-percent increase of salaries in “new type schools” has 
been inherited from the Soviet Union, and appears in mayn post-Soviet countries, including 
Lithuania, see Herczyński (2008). 
9 In the late 1990s, a large number of preschools were closed due to demographic decline and 
ﬁnancial uncertainty. Some facilities were presumably converted into schools with preschools. 
10 Recall that these schools have predominantly grades one to four. 
11 We use the language of demographic migrations for simplicity, even though of course chil-
dren do not change the place of residence, but only the school. 
12 Available statistical databases provide either the break down by rayon, or by age, see, for 
example, SSO 2007. 
13 Recall that teachers of these schools receive 10-percent higher salaries. 
14 The calculation is as follows: 1.1 • 23.8 / 26 = 1.007. 
15 On the other hand, integration of special needs students is a more diﬃcult process requiring 
a more active role (regulations, training, changes in ﬁnancing) from the national ministry 
of education. 
16 See Monitoring Center of Kiev Education (2007). 
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17 These subjects are in addition to the curriculum mandated by the Ministry of Education. 
Funds required for these subjects are included in city ﬁnancial normatives. My Kiev covers 
history and geography of the city. 
18 See Cabinet of Ministers (2001). 
19 See, for example, the discussion of a possible normatives for specialized schools in Section 3. 
20 Horizontal equity means creating similar conditions and opportunities for students in similar 
schools, irrespective of school location. 
21 This assessment is made on the basis of a few interviews with directors of Kiev schools. 
22 If a few rayons increase their expenditure on a speciﬁc type of school, then next year’s 
normatives will automatically be increased by the corresponding margin, independently of 
the plans and strategies at the city level. 
23 In fact, there were between one and three amendments in each year from 2001 to 2007; 
however, the education part of the formula remained relative stable. See below the changes 
introduced since 2003. 
24 Other expenditures include funds for social-economic development of local governments, 
assessed proportionally to population, and also lump sums for ARC, Kiev, and Sevastopol 
(in 2008 the lump sums were equal to UAH 60 million, 350 million, and 30 million 
respectively). 
25 In Ukraine, all cities are divided into “cities,” which are the capitals of oblasts or of ARC (26 
cities) and into “cities of oblast status,” which means all other, smaller cities located in the 
oblasts (or in ARC). Two cities have special status (recognized through special laws dedicated 
to them), namely Kiev and Sevastopol. 
26 Here and below, orphans stand for actual orphans and for children deprived of parental 
support.
27 Students of boarding schools are either full-time (staying) students who live in the dormitory 
which is part of the boarding school, or day students (attending students), that is, students 
living at home who come to the school only for lessons.
28 The discussion of 2004 formulas is based on Voytov (2003). The values for coeﬃcients in 
2007 were deduced from Kiev city calculations. 
29 See also the discussion of the consolidated budgets of Kiev city and rayons in comments 
following Table 1.2. 
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INTRODUCTION
The city of Kiev is undertaking a series of wide-ranging reforms of its internal man-
agement and ﬁnance systems. The current Law of Kiev is being discussed and new 
proposals are being put forward. Inevitably, these changes will have profound and long-
lasting impact on the delivery of all public services in the city. The present report focuses 
on one key public service, namely education, and reviews the options open to reformers. 
Kiev enjoys a very special place in the Ukrainian system of public ﬁnance, as the 
detailed division of revenues and expenditure competencies between the city itself and 
its independent rayon authorities are not deﬁned in the legislation. Indeed, the main 
law governing local public ﬁnance in Ukraine, namely the Budget Codex, treats the city 
as a single unit and leaves the determination of speciﬁc budget functions to the Law on 
Capital City and to the city administration (the same is true of the city of Sevastopol, 
although for diﬀerent political reasons). Due to this fact, the city has considerable 
freedom in setting its internal rules of public ﬁnance, and in particular for setting its 
internal rules regarding the ﬁnancing of education. A speciﬁc model developed for 
that purpose and operating in Kiev until the present time is described in the author’s 
report Between City and Rayons (2011, see the ﬁrst case study of the present volume). 
We refer to this as the current model. The current model assumes a signiﬁcant sphere of 
independence of the rayons from the central city administration, and includes, as one 
of its constitutive elements, an assessment system for the budget needs of the rayons in 
the education sector based on ﬁve normatives of budget need (see Herczyński 2011). 
The current model is now being questioned and revisited. Therefore a review of 
more general issues and principles of education ﬁnance at the present time might be 
useful for the reformers of Kiev’s public ﬁnance system. Clearly, it is always the duty 
and challenge of new administration taking over the responsibility for the city to re-
view the current model and decide on its future reforms and course of action. In this 
context, there is always intrinsic value in using past experience when assessing options 
for future reforms. In the case of education ﬁnance in Kiev, the report (Herczyński 
2011) provides both a description of the current system, as well as an identiﬁcation of 
its achievements and challenges. It may therefore be used as a reference for assessing 
possible alternative models. 
The present note is a policy discussion paper of general character, and it does not 
propose speciﬁc solutions to the challenges facing the reformers of Kiev’s administrative 
structures in education. Such speciﬁc solutions may emerge only in close collaboration 
of city oﬃcials with Kiev and national experts. The goal of the note, instead, is to for-
mulate the main options clearly and to assess their respective beneﬁts and shortcomings, 
so as to assist Kiev oﬃcials and experts in their discussions and to allow them to reach 
a reasonable and workable consensus. 
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Three basic models for future management of Kiev education are discussed, together 
with the best ﬁnancing mechanisms compatible with these models: a centralized model, 
a model with strong autonomous rayons, and a model with strong autonomous schools. 
It may be noted that the centralized model seems to be the favorite of the present city 
administration, the autonomous rayons model was the preferred option of the author’s 
report (Herczyński 2011), and the third model was consistent with the policy goals of 
the previous city administration.
Section 1 focuses on four basic principles of education management and ﬁnance, 
applicable to all education systems but having special importance for Kiev schools. 
These principles are then used as criteria for assessing possible managerial solutions. In 
Section 2, the three models are proposed and brieﬂy discussed. The discussion focuses 
on problems and challenges which each model presents for its proper implementation. 
The third section provides a comparative review of the three models, which consists of 
applying the criteria developed below. The ﬁnal section summarizes the ﬁndings and 
provides some general conclusions.
The present note is based primarily on the research conducted by the author and 
summarized in Herczyński (2011), the ﬁrst case study of the present volume. It also uses 
a number of internal policy notes written by the author for the leadership of the Main 
Education Department in the City of Kiev in 2008 and 2009, listed in the references. 
Additional sources of information were the education strategy adopted by Kiev City 
Counsil in 2006, a general review of eﬃciency of Ukrainian education published by the 
World Bank (2008) and an internal policy note prepared in 2009 by staﬀ of the Main 
Education Department, S. V. Prokhorenko. The author is grateful to former head of 
the Main Education Department, Lilia Mihailivna Hrinevich, to Svitlana Viktorievna 
Prohorenko, and to Irina Faion from LGI for open discussions and friendly criticism.
CRITERIA FOR EDUCATION MANAGEMENT AND 
FINANCE SYSTEMS
In this section we formulate four simple criteria that should guide thinking about the 
future structuring of management and ﬁnance of education in Kiev, namely principles 
of equity, accessibility, stability, and transparency. While our discussions in the succeeding 
sections focus on the city of Kiev, the principles themselves are more universal and may 
be useful for reform of the education system across Ukraine. To assist this, the formula-
tion of the principles is deliberately kept at a more general level. 
By the principle of equity we mean the obligation of local authorities to provide 
adequate and equal education to all children and youth living in the city. By adequate 
we mean that city authorities, building on national norms but supplementing them 
with their own additional regulations and programs, ensure that all students receive a 
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deﬁned minimum standard education, in terms of teaching time (adequate availability 
of teaching process), teacher resources (adequate availability of qualiﬁed teachers), class 
size (adequate conditions in the classroom, such as avoidance of overcrowding), and 
school equipment (adequate availability of teaching aids, including computers, and access 
to school library). By equal we mean that the basic conditions for providing education 
in the city schools should be of a similar level, and in particular should not depend on 
the location of the school (in a poor or rich rayon) nor on the wealth of the parents 
(through ﬁnancial or in kind parental contributions). There are legitimate diﬀerences 
in the provision of education, based on curriculum norms (specialized schools), school 
proﬁles (artistic or sports schools), an education stage (initial or secondary education). 
However, these diﬀerences should be based on merit and should be monitored closely 
by the city. For example, obtaining the status of specialized school should be a regulated 
process and should be based on clear norms and procedures, to avoid the situation in 
which all schools in some areas are specialized and become entitled to additional ﬁnanc-
ing, while all schools in other areas remain unspecialized. 
An important part of the principle of equity is the obligation of the city to provide 
a similar level of funding on a per student and per class basis to students receiving the 
same education and coming from roughly the same background. If some schools receive 
relatively large funding from the city, while other schools relatively little, leading to 
discernible diﬀerences in the provision of education (smaller class sizes, more teaching 
eﬀort per class, more additional professional staﬀ in the schools, better conditions of 
school buildings or more teaching equipment), then the principle of equity may be 
violated. Of course, there are always natural diﬀerences between individual schools due 
to the time of their construction or most recent renovation due to diﬀerent eﬀorts of 
the school director in procuring additional supplies to the school or due to diﬀerent 
willingness and ability of parents to support the school. Therefore the city needs to 
deﬁne what levels of disparities between the schools are legitimate and acceptable, and 
what diﬀerences are inequitable and require intervention by the city authorities. Also 
the procedures of such potential interventions need to be established by the city and 
applied carefully. 
By the principle of accessibility we mean that obligation of the local authorities to 
provide free and equal access to education. In the speciﬁc conditions of Kiev, this means: 
 • No ﬁnancial barriers to access to local schools. If the student resides in the catch-
ment area of a particular school, the school cannot impose formal or informal 
charges or other contributions as a condition of enrollment. The status of special-
ized school or the activities of School Support Council (parental organizations 
established to work with most of the public schools in Kiev) must not create 
barriers to enrollment. 
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 • No non-merit exclusion from access to specialized schools. If the city maintains 
specialized schools with speciﬁc focus or proﬁle, for example, artistic, language, 
or sports schools, or schools with speciﬁc educational proﬁle (European proﬁle, 
folk culture proﬁle), then access to this school to interested students should be 
clearly deﬁned in the school’s statutes and procedures and should be enforced 
by the city authorities. 
There is some evidence that equal access to renowned Kiev schools is not always in 
actual practice assured. 
By the principle of stability we mean the obligation of the city to avoid sudden and 
unexpected changes in the way the schools are managed and ﬁnanced. A sudden decrease 
of funding from year to year carries the risk that school activities will be disrupted or 
jeopardized. However, a sudden increase of funding may also result in non-optimal use 
of new funds (schools need to be prepared to spend the additional money well). Simi-
larly, sudden changes in the levels of employment, including teachers, administration, 
professional staﬀ such as psychologists or speech therapists, and technical staﬀ may also 
threaten stable functioning of the school. The key aspect of the principle of stability is 
ensuring predictability of school ﬁnance. School directors and school managers should 
not be left worrying how and in what way their schools will be ﬁnanced in the future. 
Instead, they should be free to concentrate on managing the pedagogical process. 
There is no doubt that the principle of stability is especially hard to implement dur-
ing the ongoung worldwide ﬁnancial crisis. However, it should be kept in mind when 
reviewing possible models of school management and ﬁnance in Kiev. 
Finally, by the principle of transparency we mean the obligation of local authorities to 
provide timely and adequate information to the schools, teachers, students, and parents 
regarding key decisions. Thus, for example, each school should know its expected levels 
of employment and funding, as well as the rules and procedures used by the authorities 
to determine the number of school staﬀ and the school budget. If the city ﬁnances new 
programs or projects in the schools or undertakes school improvement programs, schools 
and parents should be clearly and fully informed before new activities are undertaken. 
The four listed criteria may be used both to assess the proposed models of educa-
tion management and ﬁnance, as is done in the following section, and to assess actual 
functioning of the local education systems. The latter use of the criteria is far more 
important but at the same time more diﬃcult. 
THREE MAIN POLICY OPTIONS 
In order to keep the discussion compact and focused on the key problems, we propose 
to review three main options for the structure of the local education system in Kiev and 
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discuss the strong and weak points of each option. In practice, as education is a complex 
sphere of local activities addressing diﬀerent needs and interests, no solution in education 
is ever a pure application of one model. Moreover, for the same reasons various elements 
of diﬀerent models often may harmoniously coexist, so the three options should be seen 
more as three diﬀerent aspects rather than as three mutually exclusive models. However, 
by focusing of the discussion on three clearly deﬁned and distinct model solutions we 
are able to provide more clarity and point to important issues. This will also allow us 
to apply the criteria established in the previous section to each model, to identify both 
the intrinsic values and the intrinsic limitations of each model. 
The three main options are as follows: 
 1) Centralized management of education
  Under this option, the city introduces a citywide system of management and 
ﬁnance and treats all schools in exactly the same way, independently of their 
location, taking into account only the speciﬁc character of the school. Rayon 
administrations become the territorial oﬃces of the central city administration 
and lose their political autonomy. In particular, rayon councils become irrelevant 
or are altogether abolished. 
 2) Strong autonomous rayons
  Under this option, major responsibilities for the management and ﬁnance of 
schools are delegated to rayons. The central city administration is reduced to 
deﬁne citywide norms and procedures, as well as to auditing and crisis inter-
vention. The city also needs to deﬁne the allocation of funds for education to 
the rayons, for example, through an education subsidy based on the number 
of students. 
 3) Independent autonomous schools
  Under this option, the city creates a legal and institutional basis for strong 
autonomous schools, with well-deﬁned budgets and guaranteed ﬁnancial and 
pedagogical autonomy. The city needs to deﬁne allocation procedures for the 
schools (through some form of voucher or other needs-based system). The city 
will also need professional monitoring systems, to prevent inferior educational 
performance or ﬁnancial abuse. 
We discuss the strengths and weakness of each model separately in three subsections 
below. In the ﬁnal subsection we provide a short comparative review. 
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Centralized Management of Education
By a centralized management of schools we mean the system in which rayon administra-
tions are subordinate units of the overall city administration, acting as deconcentrated 
oﬃces in the territory of the rayons. Due to the size of Kiev, with its nearly ﬁve million 
inhabitants, and due to the size of its school system, with over 500 schools, the central-
ized administration needs deconcentrated oﬃces to eﬀectively manage the whole system. 
In other words, Rayon Education Departments will be in eﬀect delegated units of the 
Main Education Department of the city, with no managerial autonomy. Accordingly, 
the ﬁnancing of the schools will be based on the same principles and conducted in the 
same conditions irrespective of the school location. 
Under such a system, there are no separate budgets of rayons, and the responsibility 
for managing and ﬁnancing schools rests with the Main Education Department and the 
Main Budget Department. Very clearly, such a centralized system is rather diﬀerent from 
the current system (see Herczyński 2011). Currently, the rayons have their own budgets, 
approved through the vote of the rayon council. Given the very unequal distribution of 
tax and non-tax city revenues across the territory of the city, the centrally located rayons 
enjoy considerably stronger ﬁscal position than peripheral rayons. Indeed, as Table 2.1 
shows, per capita budgets of city rayons (including education) range from 75 percent 
to over 195 percent of the city average. 
Table 2.1
Population and Per Capita Revenues of Kiev Rayons
Rayon Population 
(thousand)
Percent of 
total
Per capita 
budget (UAH)
Percent of 
city average
1 Golosiivskiy 219.1 8.2 985.2 98.5
2 Darnickiy 293.6 11.0 864.4 86.5
3 Desnanskiy 345.1 12.9 750.1 75.0
4 Dniprovskiy 337.3 12.6 902.4 90.3
5 Obolonskiy 308.1 11.5 849.5 85.0
6 Pecherskiy 129.9 4.9 1,225.9 122.6
7 Podilskiy 181.9 6.8 1,188.8 118.9
8 Svyatoshinskiy 319.9 12.0 923.8 92.4
9 Solomyanskiy 317.6 11.9 851.5 85.2
10 Shevchenkiskiy 224.3 8.4 1,962.7 196.3
Total 2,676.8 100.0 999.8 100.0
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As a result, the central rayons may allocate to their schools considerable resources, 
signiﬁcantly more than on the city’s periphery. This deep-seated inequality of the cur-
rent model has been analyzed in Herczyński (2009) and will be clearly absent under a 
centralized system. The resulting increase of fairness of the system is indisputably the 
key beneﬁt of the centralized model. 
However, centralization of education management and ﬁnance in the city is not 
an easy task, and requires careful preparation and planning. We formulate below four 
pivotal challenges facing the city, should it decide to move in this direction. 
The ﬁrst challenge will be to allocate new tasks and responsibilities to diﬀerent levels 
of city administration. The expanded Main Education Department (through inclusion 
of the rayon departments) needs to develop eﬀective procedures for management of 
the huge school network in Kiev and for ﬁnancing these schools. Certainly, the former 
rayonal education departments, now subordinated (delegated) units of the Main Depart-
ment, will have to maintain many of their current roles in the sector, if only because 
Kiev schools form a system too large to be managed eﬃciently by one centralized ap-
paratus. Therefore, a new division of responsibilities between the Main Department 
and the oﬃces in the rayons will have to be devised and implemented. Accordingly, 
new procedures should be written. In fact, a clear description of the relevant task and 
of the ﬂow of documents will be an extremely useful managerial step, in sharp contrast 
to the present system, largely based on laws and ordinances issued by the Ministry of 
Education—under such a system, the issues not covered in detail in legislation remain 
confusing and leave unnecessary freedom to oﬃcials. 
The second challenge is the monitoring of processes taking place in schools. Here, 
the key role needs to be played by the recently implemented education management 
and information system in Kiev, called AS Shkola. There is no doubt that AS Shkola is 
a major asset of Kiev education and its use will contribute to good monitoring of the 
sector. Nevertheless, this system probably needs revision and strengthening, so that it can 
correspond to the new management and monitoring needs of the centralized education 
system in Kiev. Among directions for the strengthening of AS Shkola one can formulate 
the inclusion of all data ﬁles and data items used currently in the rayons for managing 
and control processes. These are employment levels for each school (Штатний розпис), 
detailed school budgets (Кошторис), pedagogical salaries according to tariﬁcation 
(тарифікацa), and accounting of meals of students (Розрахунок харчування). In 
order to include all these data ﬁles in the centralized system, their present formats should 
be uniﬁed across the city (presently, almost every rayon uses a diﬀerent formatting and 
structure of these ﬁles). 
The third challenge is the development of city-wide procedures (or instructions) 
regarding the key processes of school complectation and school tariﬁcation. These 
bureaucratic processes are still part of obligatory procedures; the ﬁrst one governs the 
process of forming classes in schools (and of assigning teachers to diﬀerent classes), the 
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second one is a calculation of teacher salaries based on the current workload of teachers. 
As long as Ukraine maintains these two old-fashioned, Soviet-style procedures, they 
must be used in all Kiev schools. However, the application of the rules is diﬀerent in 
diﬀerent rayons, and therefore the city needs to develop uniform instructions to ensure 
equity (equal treatment of diﬀerent schools irrespective of their location). Due to the 
scale of the work involved, it seems reasonable to assume that these procedures will be 
carried out in the rayons (see ﬁrst challenge above). Without instructions the city will 
not achieve uniformity. 
The ﬁnal fourth challenge regards the ﬁnancing of schools. It will be very diﬃcult to 
implement rational funding of schools without introducing some educational standards 
for the city. The areas that these standards may cover include the following: 
 • Standards for class sizes. Ukrainian legislation is very generous in not deﬁning 
the minimum number of students in a class. However, the cost of the result-
ing ineﬃciencies has to be covered by the school owners, that is by the cities. 
Under a centralized management and ﬁnance system, given the large number 
of students and classes in Kiev schools, strict standards deﬁned by the city and 
enforced in all Kiev schools will be necessary. 
 • Standards for extracurricular teaching. Kiev is well known for an innovative 
approach to provision of education, with a number of subjects and textbooks 
developed by the city for its own schools. These should be clearly stated in city 
documents along with the consequences for schools (number of teaching hours 
at the disposal of the school director and the degree of freedom the schools will 
have in allocating these hours). 
 • Employment norms for non-teaching staﬀ. Here, we mean the number of allowed 
positions in schools for administration (for example, based on the number of 
classes), for support pedagogical staﬀ (for example, based on the number of 
students), and for technical staﬀ (for example, based on the building parameters). 
 • Standards for school equipment. As the richest city in Ukraine, Kiev has been 
able to invest heavily in its educational infrastructure. However, this was done 
largely through a series of investment projects, as the city budget and rayon 
budgets allowed. Moreover, the level and modernity of school equipment varies 
among the schools and among the rayons (in part due to diﬀerent ﬁscal posi-
tions of diﬀerent rayons). A much more sustainable approach is to deﬁne in a 
city document the required level of school equipment and to ensure through 
inspection that all the schools have this minimum level of equipment. 
The importance of setting these norms relates to their immediate impact on the cost 
of running Kiev schools. Introduction of obligatory norms and their eﬀective enforce-
ment in all Kiev schools will be a major step towards equity in Kiev’s education sector. 
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We also note that the centralization of Kiev education requires solving some serious 
legal and practical problems. One of them regards the ownership of school facilities. 
Since under the centralized model all decisions regarding the network, such as closing or 
opening of schools or of granting them special status (for instance, the status of special-
ized school), will be taken at the central level, the facilities should also be owned by the 
city itself. The second problem concerns the procedure for selecting school directors. The 
city will not be able to pursue its education policies without support and cooperation 
of all directors. Therefore, the city needs a dominating inﬂuence over their selection 
process. Due to the size of the Kiev school network, this will require development of 
strict guidelines for the selection and appraisal of school directors and of appropriate 
procedures. The procedures should also cover the process of dismissing the school 
director if she or he fails to follow established guidelines and other legal requirements. 
Strong Autonomous Rayons 
Recent decisions of the city authorities, such as dissolution of the rayon councils of depu-
ties, seem to indicate that the rayons will have a much reduced role, and in particular 
will not have separate political identity deﬁned through own elected governing bodies. 
This precludes the scenario of strong autonomous rayons as owners and managers of 
Kiev schools. However, even if this option is presently not accepted, it is still worth 
reviewing it brieﬂy, at least in order to have a comprehensive review of the beneﬁts and 
challenges of diﬀerent models of education management in the city. 
The system of strong autonomous rayons assumes that the real managing power 
over the school networks is delegated to 10 independent rayons. Under such a scenario, 
the main decisions in the sector are entrusted to the rayons, and the city administra-
tion assumes the role of overseeing the whole system, ensuring fairness and access, and 
intervening in cases when students’ or teachers’ rights are not respected. It should not 
be involved in regular managerial decisions and in the ﬁnancing of individual schools. 
In the area of education management, this model requires strict limitation of the 
powers of the central city administration in the sector, so that, for example, decisions 
regarding the school network, assessment and appointment of school directors, the 
specialization process of schools and comparable decisions are ﬁrmly delegated to the 
rayons. This is in sharp contrast to the current model, under which many decisions 
are left for non-transparent negotiations between the schools, rayons, and central city 
administration. 
In the area of school ﬁnance, this model requires a speciﬁc grant for educational 
tasks from the city budget to the rayon budget, as well as a ﬁnancial mechanism to 
equalize per capita revenues of diﬀerent rayons. These two elements are clearly lacking 
in the current model, in which there is no speciﬁc transfer for education to the rayons, 
and equalization of revenues of diﬀerent rayons is very weak. 
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However, one key element of this model is already well established, although some-
what hidden in the complex system of Kiev public ﬁnance. Namely, the city already has 
key elements of the allocation formula in the form of ﬁve normatives of budget needs 
in education. The normatives are described in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2
Kiev Normatives of Budget Needs in Education in 2007 and 2008
Normative of budget needs 2007 2008 Growth 
2007–08
Value Relative Value Relative
1 Preschool 4,665 177.9% 6,590 164.6% 41.3%
2 General secondary school 2,622 100.0% 4,003 100.0% 52.7%
3 Boarding school 11,963 456.3% 17,512 437.5% 46.4%
4 Special boarding school 16,295 621.5% 23,116 577.5% 41.9%
5 Orphanage 28,315 1,080.0% 42,099 1,051.7% 48.7%
The normatives are deﬁned for the ﬁve most common educational institutions in 
the city: preschools, general secondary schools, general and special boarding schools, 
as well as for boarding schools for orphans (the extreme values of this last normative 
is due to the fact that besides educational purposes, the funds are used to support all 
life functions of the students). Interestingly and signiﬁcantly, no special normative is 
used for specialized secondary schools. The normatives may play the role of a fair and 
transparent allocation formula, if they are developed and used systematically in a larger 
ﬁnancial model, which should include a clear assignment of revenues to rayon budgets, 
alongside assignment of expenditure responsibilities. 
The key ﬁrst challenge of introducing the system of strong autonomous rayons is to 
develop their budgetary independence. This means deﬁning and implementing a clear 
system of rayon revenue and expenditure responsibilities and giving rayon councils real 
power over the adoption, execution, monitoring, and reporting of their own budgets. 
This also means that rayon ﬁnances should be based on some stable foundations, so that 
the city does not use budget negotiations every year to change the rules of the game. 
This is a diﬃcult challenge to meet. In particular, this model requires rethinking of the 
positioning and ﬁnancing of all sectors of city public ﬁnance, not only in education but 
also in health, economy, social protection, water supplies, energy, roads, and so on. While 
the decisions regarding each sector may diﬀer, some measure of logic and consistency 
is clearly necessary. Some sectors may be more centralized, other may be decentralized 
to the rayons, yet the overall system needs to be balanced and rational. 
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The following conditions should be met: 
 • Deﬁnition of rayon revenues. These should be based on sectoral transfers from 
the city. A separate transfer should be deﬁned for each sector, in which rayons 
have responsibility, such as health, education, street cleaning, and so on. Rayon 
revenues may also include a ﬁxed share of personal income tax, although these 
are collected on the basis of location of the employer (not the taxpayer), and 
therefore the distribution of these speciﬁc revenues is skewed towards the central 
rayons. A separate equalizing transfer may also have to be introduced. 
 • Within such a system of transfers, speciﬁc care needs to be taken with regards 
to how an education transfer is allocated to the rayons. The allocation mecha-
nism should be based on the ﬁve normatives developed over the course of many 
years by the city, yet at the same time should be subjected to public scrutiny 
and discussion. In particular, the relative values of the normative need to be 
reviewed and critically assessed, and it might turn out that Kiev needs more 
than ﬁve normatives. 
 • Rayons should be given the powers to augment the education grant received 
from the city budget with other budgetary resources, and also perhaps to deduct 
funds from this grant in case it is more than suﬃcient for education expenditures 
and the rayon sees better alternative ways of spending the excess funds. This is 
one of the key strategic decisions that need to be taken when developing and 
implementing the autonomous rayon model. 
There is also the second challenge, namely the institutional challenge of ensuring that 
rayon councils are democratically elected bodies able to resist pressures and expecta-
tions of the central city administration in order to represent the interests and hopes of 
their rayonal electorates. Strong rayons become a meaningful possible solution only if 
elections to the rayonal councils are democratic and introduce some measure of local 
accountability. At the same time, they should be seen to be independent of the city 
administration. For example, it should be perfectly possible for a diﬀerent political 
option to hold power at the city level and at the rayon level. Once again we see that 
the success of institutional reform of Kiev’s education system is strongly tied to more 
general reforms and strategies, encompassing not only the education sector but all the 
sectors and also the main political institutions in the city. 
The third challenge will be how to deal with student migrations across rayon bound-
aries. As discussed in Herczyński (2009), this migration is quite signiﬁcant and has a 
well-deﬁned direction: from peripheral, weaker, and poorer rayons towards the central 
rayons. Under the centralized model this migration is not relevant. However, under the 
strong rayon model, the fact that students are able and willing to select schools from 
all over the city means that the rayons will be responsible not only for the education of 
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children of their own citizens, but also for the education of children coming in from 
other rayons (as well as coming in from outside the city of Kiev). If a rayon decides to 
augment its received education fund from such revenues as shared taxes, it will eﬀectively 
be using money from its own taxpayers to improve learning conditions for taxpayers 
of other rayons. This potential conﬂict of interest cannot be entirely resolved; however, 
some measures may be instituted to make it less harmful. One way of achieving this, 
for example, is to ensure that the education grant per student is suﬃcient for educa-
tion of high quality, reducing the need for augmenting it with own revenues of rayons. 
However, these problems are not easy to assess and resolve. 
Finally, a perhaps less fundamental but still relevant fourth challenge regards the skills 
and qualiﬁcations of staﬀ of rayon administrations. Under the current model, rayon staﬀ 
has immediate access to the skills and competencies of the central city administration 
(indeed, the main career path of city oﬃcials is to start at the rayon level and proceed 
to the city level if they excel in their work). However, under the strong rayon model the 
interests and institutional goals of rayon oﬃcials and of city oﬃcials may diverge. Rayon 
administrations will try to service their own electorate and the children of their inhabit-
ants rather than cooperate with other rayons. This will be apparent in many areas, such 
as competition for investment funds or in discussions of allocation procedures (so that 
one’s rayon is not a loser in overall system reforms). This element of rivalry may reduce 
the willingness of separate administrations to learn from each other, and consequently 
will heighten the need for separate training programs. 
It is of utmost importance not only how managerial and budgetary responsibilities 
are allocated between the three levels (schools, rayons, city), but also where will they 
be deﬁned. If they are stated in the decisions adopted by the city council, they risk 
being changed and overturned whenever a conﬂict arises. If they are stated in national 
laws, for example, in the Law on the Capital City or in the Budget Code, then this 
introduces an additional element of rigidity and even potentially serious mistakes will be 
diﬃcult to correct. Nevertheless, over time the deﬁnition of the powers and expenditure 
responsibilities of the rayons should be regulated nationally to be consistent with the 
powers and responsibilities of other levels of local government across Ukraine. The Budget 
Code is at present the key legislation in this area, so over time it should be expanded 
to include a description of the normative revenues and normative expenditures of Kiev 
rayons. 
Strong Autonomous Schools
The model of strong autonomous schools assumes that the school is the basic educa-
tional institution, able to oversee and manage its own pedagogical eﬀorts, introduce new 
teaching techniques, monitor the progress of students, and analyze performance of all 
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teachers, as well as deﬁne, execute and report its yearly budget. Autonomous schools, 
usually working alongside strong school boards or councils of parents and teachers, act 
independently of each other in conditions of competition for students. This competition 
may lead to development of new teaching programs and educational oﬀers to students, 
and over time to better school performance. 
The present Ukrainian education legislation leaves some room for school autonomy; 
however, this is rather restricted and does not encompass aspects of school life as enumer-
ated above. Proper implementation of such a system in Kiev would require, apart from 
own decisions of the city administration, also amendments to the laws on education, 
on general secondary education, on vocational education and related legislation. Never-
theless, even today some elements of school autonomy are legally feasible, as shown by 
the experience of Desnanski rayon, where schools function in conditions of signiﬁcant 
budgetary autonomy, employing their own accountants. In the discussion below, we use 
some of the experiences gathered in Desnanski rayon over the last 15 years. 
The ﬁrst challenge to introducing the model of strong autonomous schools is the 
legal deﬁnition of a school in the Ukrainian system. Although by law the school is a 
legal persona with all the responsibilities and rights of an independent institution, in 
practice the schools operate as parts of a wider institutional entity, namely the local 
government, which owns the schools. The school budget is determined through a 
complex procedure, and typically the school director does not understand all the details 
of the school budget and is not involved in this process. The accounting is performed 
outside the school. Budgetary decisions are very closely connected to the overall budget 
of the local government, so they are outside the ﬁeld of interest and inﬂuence of the 
director. However, the model of strong autonomous schools assumes that each school 
is an independent institution, able to perform its own budgeting and accounting, only 
monitored by state institutions such as audit or school inspection. The implementation 
of this model therefore requires not only redeﬁnition of the budget process in educa-
tion (moving away from the complectation and tarriﬁcation towards a more rational 
procedure for employment and budget deﬁnition), but also introduction of modern 
monitoring procedures, which will ensure early identiﬁcation of breaches of the laws, of 
possible discrimination against some students, and of potential abuses of funds, while 
respecting and strengthening decision-making at the school level. Such monitoring 
procedures would be a novelty in today’s Ukraine, making this a very serious challenge 
to the introduction of this model in practice. 
An important part of this challenge is the deﬁnition of new management structures 
for Kiev schools. Under the current model, most managerial decisions, such as setting 
the number of staﬀ of diﬀerent types, are taken by the rayon administrations or school 
directors, subject to approval from the rayon. To maintain the public character of Kiev 
schools, alternative management lines will have to be established. A typical approach 
is to set up school boards, composed of representatives of teachers, parents, and city 
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oﬃcials. The school boards will need to have their powers clearly deﬁned. Among the 
key problems is deciding who will select the school director. If the school director will 
be appointed by the school board, then the detailed composition of the board and its 
working procedures become extremely important and subtle issues. On the one hand, 
excessive representation of the school staﬀ may eﬀectively reduce societal control over 
the school, turning it into some sort of self-managed enterprise with no real owner. 
However, it is also dangerous to increase representation of the parents, as they have very 
speciﬁc and passing interests in the school activities (usually members of the school board 
resign as soon as their children graduate from the school) and are seldom suﬃciently 
familiar with the pedagogical problems facing the school. It seems that introduction of 
powerful school boards with eﬀective control over school activities will require changes 
to the national legislation. 
We may use here the example of Desnanskiy rayon. The schools in the rayon obtained 
signiﬁcant budgetary and accounting autonomy at the beginning of independence of 
Ukraine, when the local governments were very weak and faced a dramatic ﬁnancial crisis. 
Under those conditions, autonomy seemed a good way for allowing school directors, in 
ever changing circumstances, to seek and ensure some ﬁnancial stability. However, the 
succeeding years brought to the country increasing stability and predictability, and at 
the same time saw development of more eﬀective monitoring and control systems. This 
reduced the eﬀective autonomy of schools in Desnanskiy rayon, despite their tradition 
of setting their own budgets and maintaining their own accounting. A further blow to 
school autonomy was delivered with the introduction of the national treasury system. 
The schools in Desnanskiy rayon, unique in Kiev, became entities served directly by 
the treasury system. Subordination of school accounting to the requirements of the 
treasury system gave the city administration a powerful tool of control over the school 
budget process (it is a separate question whether that tool was well used). Thus the lack 
of proper national legislation means that the autonomy of schools in Desnanskiy rayon, 
despite the original intention, has become somewhat illusory. 
This leads us directly to the second challenge, namely to the limitations of the treasury 
system in Kiev (the same limitations may be valid for all local governments in Ukraine, 
but their speciﬁc manifestations are probably diﬀerent in diﬀerent cities). Indeed, all 
budgetary independent institutions use the oﬃcial treasury system to conduct their ac-
counting and to make payments. Therefore, the ability of the treasury system to provide 
adequate service for school accounting, in particular to execute transactions and to furnish 
schools with timely and complete accounting information, becomes quite important. 
It seems that the treasury system in Kiev is able to execute transactions required by 
the schools but is not really responsive to their information needs. It is more a tool for 
budget execution than for management monitoring. It also imposes strong bureaucratic 
requirements on how city institutions, including the schools, operate. 
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Once again using the experience of Desnanskiy rayon, we note that the submission 
of accounting documents to the treasury system is a time-consuming and bureaucratic 
process. In order to satisfy the expectations of the treasury system, schools have to employ 
more than one accountant each. Thus, even simply executing the budget is a diﬃcult 
process. Extending the procedures operating in Desnanskiy rayon to the whole city 
without reforming the treasury system will increase the administrative and operational 
burden on schools without providing them serious advantages in terms of more eﬀec-
tive budgeting and planning. 
The third challenge to successful implementation of this model is related to the neces-
sary new ﬁnancial mechanisms for the schools. The city needs to deﬁne the transfers to 
public schools and at the same time also new allocation procedures. Typical allocation 
methods used in diﬀerent countries to ﬁnance independent schools are various forms of 
school vouchers, that is, ﬁnancial transfers proportional to the number of students. For 
Kiev, the starting point for the voucher system could be the present ﬁve normatives of 
budgetary need (as discussed in the previous sections). Simple school vouchers, however, 
create strong inequalities between the schools. Indeed, if the school budget is deﬁned 
as the number of students (enrolled, for example, on September 15 of the previous 
year) multiplied by a ﬁxed ﬁnancial amount or normative (the voucher), than typically 
small schools are at a disadvantage and large schools receive relatively very generous 
allocations. Therefore, more careful approaches use subtler ﬁnancial mechanisms, for 
example, by adding a lump sum component into the formula, by creating more types 
of vouchers for diﬀerent types of schools, or by breaking down allocated amounts into 
smaller separate pieces. The later approach, for example, may distinguish between al-
location for regular teaching and care, for the ﬁnancing of students with special needs, 
for dedicated programs for gifted students, and ﬁnally funds for the maintenance of 
school infrastructure. However, when the ﬁnancial system becomes more complex, it 
will raise more discussions and more issues, so reaching political compromise on the 
adopted solutions will be more diﬃcult. 
The ﬁnal fourth challenge concerns the existence and activities of parental organiza-
tions (попечительский комитет, попечительский совет) established at virtually 
all Kiev schools. While such associations exist in most Ukrainian schools, their strength 
and inﬂuence is particularly strong in the capital city, home to many wealthy parents. By 
law, theses are voluntary charitable associations of parents, established with the scope of 
providing additional funds to schools through donations, organization of school fairs, 
and other activities. However, in practice their role in Kiev schools is much greater. The 
extra-budgetary funds collected by these associations in some cases are comparable to 
the budgets of the schools as deﬁned by the city administration, while in other schools 
they are rather limited. The use of these funds is controlled by the association, which 
means a few active parents working closely with the school director. In particular, the 
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city oﬃcials cannot demand and examine the books of these associations, which are 
only controlled by appropriate ﬁnancial audit. The money is used primarily for school 
investment, equipment and supplementing the salaries of school staﬀ. Typically, it is 
the school director who decides on his own which teacher or administrator should be 
paid how much. This leads to hidden but presumably very signiﬁcant variation of actual 
school budgets between the schools and rayons (some of that variation may even be 
seen while visiting some Kiev schools). It also informally but signiﬁcantly strengthens 
the position of the school director with respect to his staﬀ. Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that donations to the parental associations by parents of school students are not always 
treated as voluntary and that poorer parents ﬁnd themselves at a disadvantage. 
The future regulation of parental associations will be a key problem under any 
adopted model of Kiev education management and ﬁnance, but becomes especially 
acute under the model of strong autonomous schools. There is a clear danger that 
increasing the autonomy and budgetary independence of schools will strengthen the 
parental associations and will make them ever stronger in strategic development and in 
daily management of educational institutions. Even under the current system, the city 
administration is a rather weak monitoring agent, very limited in the information on 
activities of parental associations it can gather and in the scope of corrective measures it 
can impose. The model of strong autonomous schools will reduce this role even further. 
Therefore, alternative monitoring and control mechanisms will have to be devised and 
implemented to prevent potential de facto privatization of the best public schools in Kiev. 
COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF THREE MODELS
The three models with their speciﬁc features and challenges have been described in the 
three previous subsections. We now come to the comparative review of the models, us-
ing the principles established in Section 1 as the main criteria for assessing the models. 
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Table 2.3
Three Models Assessed by Main Principles
Principle Centralized model Autonomous rayons Autonomous schools
Eq
ui
ty
Equity may be ensured 
through rigorous 
application of citywide 
education norms
If rayons may use their 
general revenues to finance 
their schools, equity may 
become a problem, so 
strong equalization among 
the rayons might become 
necessary
Ensuring equity will 
require not only a public 
formula setting the budgets 
of all schools but also 
monitoring of parental 
contributions
Ac
ce
ss
ib
ili
ty
Procedures defined at the 
city level offer good chance 
of ensuring universal 
access, if they include 
provisions for specific 
Kiev obstacles to access 
(such as restricted access to 
specialized schools due to 
entry exams).
Access may be 
compromised because 
of serious migration of 
students between the 
rayons, making rayon-
level procedures and rules 
uneffective. 
If school catchment areas 
are abandoned, serious 
issues may appear for 
students living close to 
prestige schools but unable 
to enroll due to excessive 
competition from children 
from wealthier family 
backgrounds.
Tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
Centralized model is 
not transparent due 
to its dependence on 
administrative measures 
and controls. Therefore, 
specific steps will have 
to be taken to provide 
sufficient information to 
parents and to the general 
public. 
Publicly available allocation 
formula for education 
grants to the rayons will 
improve transparency. 
However, the second 
step of setting the school 
budgets will remain 
unclear. 
Formula defining the 
budget allocation to each 
school, based on the 
enrollment and publicly 
available, promotes 
transparency of the system. 
The main obstacle to 
transparency will remain 
the operation of parental 
committees (providing 
additional revenues to 
schools without public 
knowledge and scrutiny).
St
ab
ili
ty
If education finance is 
based on the budget of the 
whole city, its stability is 
assured due to the wide-
ranging sources of city 
revenues. 
Stability of education 
will be assured under the 
condition that the per 
student grants to rayon 
budgets are defined 
in such a way that the 
rayons have no need 
(only the opportunity) to 
complement these grants 
with funds derived from 
other rayon revenues.
Financial stability of 
schools under a system 
of per student budgets 
is threatened by sudden 
changes in student 
numbers. Stability may be 
ensured only at the expense 
of strong year-to-year 
buffers, which decreases 
allocation efficiency and 
transparency. 
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As Table 2.3 indicates, the four criteria of equity, accessibility, transparency, and 
stability are not easy to meet simultaneously. The three models of education governance 
and ﬁnance meet these criteria to diﬀering degrees, but none is universally strong or 
universally weak. Rather, we may conclude that each model presents diﬀerent diﬃcult 
challenges to an equitable, accessible, transparent, and stable system. Irrespective of 
the approach chosen, much care and thought will have to be devoted to ﬁne-tuning 
all the procedures and rules adopted in the diﬀerent spheres of education. Citywide 
public discussions of all the details of education governance and education ﬁnance 
will be necessary under any chosen scenario. In some sense, these discussions and the 
adopted procedures and rules are even more important for education ﬁnance than for 
the general direction of any future reforms. The general direction represents an overall 
policy decision and reﬂects general attitude towards city management, including all 
important sectors such as education. However, any such directions requires, for its 
proper and successful implementation, thoughtful and harmonized procedures, formulas, 
reporting mechanisms, monitoring systems, and indicators, as well as alarm thresholds 
for these indicators. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
We have presented and reviewed in Section 2 three models of education management 
and ﬁnance for Kiev’s education sector. The key challenges of each model were identi-
ﬁed and discussed. We have also provided a comparative review of the three models in 
light of more general education principles (formulated in Section 1). We are now able 
to make a few general comments regarding the three models. 
Each model has some features and solutions which may be adopted without imple-
menting all the remaining elements of the model. This means that the three models 
discussed above do not represent opposite and incompatible complete solutions, but 
are in fact three visions, which may be combined to some degree and with diﬀerent 
emphasis on what is most important or useful. It is up to Kiev oﬃcials and experts to 
agree on the speciﬁc mix of elements which will be best and most functional in the city. 
For the centralized model, the citywide education management and information 
system is certainly a key instrument which needs to be developed and used in any sce-
nario. AS Shkola is a necessary element of the centralized model, but its value is also 
apparent in the remaining models. If rayons are made strong autonomous owners of 
schools, then AS Shkola will be the key tool for the city to monitor the evolution of 
the Kiev school system, to control the performance of rayons, and for ensuring equity 
across the rayons and complete access to education. In the model of strong autonomous 
schools, the same system will play the key role in monitoring the activities of schools. 
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Nevertheless, the three models are distinct ways of managing and ﬁnancing educa-
tion. In the areas of school ﬁnance and network management, each model provides 
speciﬁc features, inconsistent with the other two models. Therefore serious thought is 
needed to assess what is best for Kiev in the present conditions. The responsibility for 
this intellectual discussion and for resolving the contradictions inherent in any serious 
reform proposals rests with Ukrainian experts. 
Some of challenges to successful reform raised in the preceding sections are common 
to all the models, but are especially acute for one of the three models. This is especially 
the case of non-monitored activities of parental associations and their eﬀects on school 
equity. As long as there is a public institution responsible for all the schools, be it the 
central city administration or the rayons, there is some recourse to potential abuses of 
power at the school level. However, the model of strong autonomous schools does not 
provide such a recourse and the challenge needs to be addressed directly. 
The focus of all of the discussions presented in the present policy note is on prob-
lems and challenges. Indeed, it is always important not to underestimate problematic 
issues and potential diﬃculties that lie ahead, especially when attempting a far-reaching 
reform of a major public service such as education. In order to avoid errors and steer 
the reforms to a successful conclusion, there is no better approach than opening public 
discussions and taking into account critical opinions and alternative suggestions. 
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